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-rw-r--r--include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
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+++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
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+/*
+ * QEMU Confidential Guest support
+ * This interface describes the common pieces between various
+ * schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a
+ * compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's
+ * SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER,
+ * or PV on s390x).
+ *
+ * Copyright Red Hat.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
+#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
+
+#include "qom/object.h"
+
+#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
+OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
+
+struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
+ Object parent;
+
+ /*
+ * ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to
+ * start executing instructions in a potentially-secure
+ * guest
+ *
+ * The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially
+ * part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism.
+ *
+ * It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine
+ * init path to configure confidential guest support, because
+ * different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring
+ * initialization in different places, often in arch or machine
+ * type specific code. It's also usually not possible to check
+ * for invalid configurations until that initialization code.
+ * That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS
+ * init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations.
+ *
+ * Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so
+ * to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is
+ * set if CGS was requested. If the CGS init hasn't happened, and
+ * so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort.
+ */
+ bool ready;
+};
+
+typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
+ ObjectClass parent;
+} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
+
+#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */
+
+#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */