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* docs: add note about stibp CPU feature for spectre v2Daniel P. Berrangé2019-03-201-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | While the stibp CPU feature is not commonly used by guest OS for spectre mitigation due to its performance impact, it is none the less best practice to expose it to all guest OS. This allows the guest OS to decide whether to make use or it. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20190307121838.6345-3-berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
* docs: clarify that spec-ctrl is only needed for Spectre v2Daniel P. Berrangé2019-03-201-4/+2Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The docs currently say that the spec-ctrl feature is needed for both Spectre variants, but it is only used to address Spectre v2. Also remove the note about retpolines. The guest OS is usually treated as a blackbox from host mgmt pov, so it won't have knowledge about use of retpolines and thus should unconditionally expose spec-ctrl, allowing the guest to decide whether to use it or not. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20190307121838.6345-2-berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
* doc: fix typos for documents in treeLike Xu2019-03-061-4/+4
| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1550640446-18788-1-git-send-email-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
* docs/qemu-cpu-models: Add MIPS/nanoMIPS QEMU supported CPU modelsStefan Markovic2019-01-241-2/+161
| | | | | | | | | Add list of supported and preferred CPU models for MIPS32, MIPS64 and nanoMIPS hosts. Signed-off-by: Aleksandar Markovic <amarkovic@wavecomp.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Markovic <smarkovic@wavecomp.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksandar Markovic <amarkovic@wavecomp.com>
* docs: add guidance on configuring CPU models for x86Daniel P. Berrangé2018-08-161-0/+484
With the recent set of CPU hardware vulnerabilities on x86, it is increasingly difficult to understand which CPU configurations are good to use and what flaws they might be vulnerable to. This doc attempts to help management applications and administrators in picking sensible CPU configuration on x86 hosts. It outlines which of the named CPU models are good choices, and describes which extra CPU flags should be enabled to allow the guest to mitigate hardware flaws. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20180627160103.13634-1-berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>