openslx-ng/ipxe.git/src/crypto, branch openslx

[build] Mark MD4 and MD5 as forbidden for UEFI Secure Boot

2026-01-14T16:10:29+00:00

A past security review identified MD4 and MD5 support as features that ought to be disabled by default. (There is zero impact on UEFI Secure Boot itself from having these algorithms enabled: this was just a side comment in the review.) As noted in the resulting commit 7f2006a ("[crypto] Disable MD5 as an OID-identifiable algorithm by default"), the actual MD5 code will almost certainly still be present in the binary due to its implicit use by various features. Disabling MD5 support via config/crypto.h simply removes the OID-identified algorithm, which prevents it from being used as an explicitly identified algorithm (e.g. in an X.509 certificate digest). Match the intent of this review comment by marking the OID-identified algorithms for MD4 and MD5 as forbidden for UEFI Secure Boot. Extend this to also disable the "md4sum" command and the use of the md5WithRSAEncryption OID-identified algorithm. (The "md5sum" command is left enabled for historical reasons, and we have no definition for md4WithRSAEncryption anyway.) Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[build] Mark known reviewed files as permitted for UEFI Secure Boot

2026-01-14T16:10:29+00:00

Some past security reviews carried out for UEFI Secure Boot signing submissions have covered specific drivers or functional areas of iPXE. Mark all of the files comprising these areas as permitted for UEFI Secure Boot. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[build] Mark core files as permitted for UEFI Secure Boot

2026-01-14T13:25:34+00:00

Mark all files used in a standard build of bin-x86_64-efi/snponly.efi as permitted for UEFI Secure Boot. These files represent the core functionality of iPXE that is guaranteed to have been included in every binary that was previously subject to a security review and signed by Microsoft. It is therefore legitimate to assume that at least these files have already been reviewed to the required standard multiple times. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Fix identification of non-wrapped elliptic curve identifiers

2025-12-22T16:14:06+00:00

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Add ECDSA-based TLS cipher suites

2025-12-19T18:18:45+00:00

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Add OID-identified algorithms for ECDSA with SHA2 hash family

2025-12-19T15:26:29+00:00

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Allow ecPublicKey to be identified as a public-key algorithm

2025-12-19T15:26:29+00:00

Add a public-key algorithm to the definition of the "ecPublicKey" OID-identified algorithm, and move this definition to ecdsa.c to avoid unconditionally dragging in ECDSA support. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[x509] Correct debug message

2025-12-19T13:54:24+00:00

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Add support for ECDSA signatures

2025-12-19T10:06:50+00:00

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown

[crypto] Allow for an explicit representation of point at infinity

2025-12-18T15:47:29+00:00

ECDSA requires the ability to add two arbitrary curve points, either of which may legitimately be the point at infinity. Update the API so that curves must choose an explicit affine representation for the point at infinity, and provide a method to test for this representation. Multiplication and addition will now allow this representation to be provided as an input, and will not fail if the result is the point at infinity. Callers must explicitly check for the point at infinity where needed (e.g. after computing the ECDHE shared secret curve point). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown