Upgrade AXTLS import to version 1.1.5-a

7 files changed, 906 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/aes.c b/src/crypto/axtls/aes.c
index 298e4193..9154a515 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/aes.c
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/aes.c
@@ -238,9 +238,6 @@ void AES_set_key(AES_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
     memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
 }
 
-#if 0
-/** currently unused function **/
-
 /**
  * Change a key for decryption.
  */
@@ -259,7 +256,6 @@ void AES_convert_key(AES_CTX *ctx)
         *k++ =w;
     }
 }
-#endif
 
 /**
  * Encrypt a byte sequence (with a block size 16) using the AES cipher.
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/axtls_asn1.c b/src/crypto/axtls/axtls_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74411c70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/axtls_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+/*
+ *  Copyright(C) 2006 Cameron Rich
+ *
+ *  This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ *  along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *  Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @file asn1.c
+ * 
+ * Some primitive asn methods for extraction rsa modulus information. It also
+ * is used for retrieving information from X.509 certificates.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "crypto.h"
+
+#define SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE     8
+
+#define SIG_TYPE_MD2            0x02
+#define SIG_TYPE_MD5            0x04
+#define SIG_TYPE_SHA1           0x05
+
+/* Must be an RSA algorithm with either SHA1 or MD5 for verifying to work */
+static const uint8_t sig_oid_prefix[SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE] = 
+{
+    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01
+};
+
+/* CN, O, OU */
+static const uint8_t g_dn_types[] = { 3, 10, 11 };
+
+static int get_asn1_length(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset)
+{
+    int len, i;
+
+    if (!(buf[*offset] & 0x80)) /* short form */
+    {
+        len = buf[(*offset)++];
+    }
+    else    /* long form */
+    {
+        int length_bytes = buf[(*offset)++]&0x7f;
+        len = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < length_bytes; i++)
+        {
+            len <<= 8;
+            len += buf[(*offset)++];
+        }
+    }
+
+    return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Skip the ASN1.1 object type and its length. Get ready to read the object's
+ * data.
+ */
+int asn1_next_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
+{
+    if (buf[*offset] != obj_type)
+        return X509_NOT_OK;
+    (*offset)++;
+    return get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Skip over an ASN.1 object type completely. Get ready to read the next
+ * object.
+ */
+int asn1_skip_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
+{
+    int len;
+
+    if (buf[*offset] != obj_type)
+        return X509_NOT_OK;
+    (*offset)++;
+    len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
+    *offset += len;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read an integer value for ASN.1 data
+ * Note: This function allocates memory which must be freed by the user.
+ */
+int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object)
+{
+    int len;
+
+    if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_INTEGER)) < 0)
+        goto end_int_array;
+
+    *object = (uint8_t *)malloc(len);
+    memcpy(*object, &buf[*offset], len);
+    *offset += len;
+
+end_int_array:
+    return len;
+}
+
+#if 0
+
+/**
+ * Get all the RSA private key specifics from an ASN.1 encoded file 
+ */
+int asn1_get_private_key(const uint8_t *buf, int len, RSA_CTX **rsa_ctx)
+{
+    int offset = 7;
+    uint8_t *modulus, *priv_exp, *pub_exp;
+    int mod_len, priv_len, pub_len;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
+    uint8_t *p, *q, *dP, *dQ, *qInv;
+    int p_len, q_len, dP_len, dQ_len, qInv_len;
+#endif
+
+    /* not in der format */
+    if (buf[0] != ASN1_SEQUENCE) /* basic sanity check */
+    {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+        printf("Error: This is not a valid ASN.1 file\n");
+#endif
+        return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
+    }
+
+    /* initialise the RNG */
+    RNG_initialize(buf, len);
+
+    mod_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &modulus);
+    pub_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &pub_exp);
+    priv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &priv_exp);
+
+    if (mod_len <= 0 || pub_len <= 0 || priv_len <= 0)
+        return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
+    p_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &p);
+    q_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &q);
+    dP_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dP);
+    dQ_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dQ);
+    qInv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &qInv);
+
+    if (p_len <= 0 || q_len <= 0 || dP_len <= 0 || dQ_len <= 0 || qInv_len <= 0)
+        return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
+
+    RSA_priv_key_new(rsa_ctx, 
+            modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len, priv_exp, priv_len,
+            p, p_len, q, p_len, dP, dP_len, dQ, dQ_len, qInv, qInv_len);
+
+    free(p);
+    free(q);
+    free(dP);
+    free(dQ);
+    free(qInv);
+#else
+    RSA_priv_key_new(rsa_ctx, 
+            modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len, priv_exp, priv_len);
+#endif
+
+    free(modulus);
+    free(priv_exp);
+    free(pub_exp);
+    return X509_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the time of a certificate. Ignore hours/minutes/seconds.
+ */
+static int asn1_get_utc_time(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, time_t *t)
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK, len, t_offset;
+    struct tm tm;
+
+    if (buf[(*offset)++] != ASN1_UTC_TIME)
+        goto end_utc_time;
+    len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
+    t_offset = *offset;
+
+    memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
+    tm.tm_year = (buf[t_offset] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+1] - '0');
+
+    if (tm.tm_year <= 50)    /* 1951-2050 thing */
+    {
+        tm.tm_year += 100;
+    }
+
+    tm.tm_mon = (buf[t_offset+2] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+3] - '0') - 1;
+    tm.tm_mday = (buf[t_offset+4] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+5] - '0');
+    *t = mktime(&tm);
+    *offset += len;
+    ret = X509_OK;
+
+end_utc_time:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the version type of a certificate (which we don't actually care about)
+ */
+static int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
+
+    (*offset) += 2;        /* get past explicit tag */
+    if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_INTEGER))
+        goto end_version;
+
+    ret = X509_OK;
+end_version:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Retrieve the notbefore and notafter certificate times.
+ */
+static int asn1_validity(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    return (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
+              asn1_get_utc_time(cert, offset, &x509_ctx->not_before) ||
+              asn1_get_utc_time(cert, offset, &x509_ctx->not_after));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the components of a distinguished name 
+ */
+static int asn1_get_oid_x520(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset)
+{
+    int dn_type = 0;
+    int len;
+
+    if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_OID)) < 0)
+        goto end_oid;
+
+    /* expect a sequence of 2.5.4.[x] where x is a one of distinguished name 
+       components we are interested in. */
+    if (len == 3 && buf[(*offset)++] == 0x55 && buf[(*offset)++] == 0x04)
+        dn_type = buf[(*offset)++];
+    else
+    {
+        *offset += len;     /* skip over it */
+    }
+
+end_oid:
+    return dn_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain an ASN.1 printable string type.
+ */
+static int asn1_get_printable_str(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, char **str)
+{
+    int len = X509_NOT_OK;
+
+    /* some certs have this awful crud in them for some reason */
+    if (buf[*offset] != ASN1_PRINTABLE_STR && 
+            buf[*offset] != ASN1_TELETEX_STR && buf[*offset] != ASN1_IA5_STR)
+        goto end_pnt_str;
+
+    (*offset)++;
+    len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
+    *str = (char *)malloc(len+1);       /* allow for null */
+    memcpy(*str, &buf[*offset], len);
+    (*str)[len] = 0;                    /* null terminate */
+    *offset += len;
+end_pnt_str:
+    return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the subject name (or the issuer) of a certificate.
+ */
+static int asn1_name(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, char *dn[])
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
+    int dn_type;
+    char *tmp = NULL;
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
+        goto end_name;
+
+    while (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SET) >= 0)
+    {
+        int i, found = 0;
+
+        if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
+               (dn_type = asn1_get_oid_x520(cert, offset)) < 0)
+            goto end_name;
+
+        if (asn1_get_printable_str(cert, offset, &tmp) < 0)
+        {
+            free(tmp);
+            goto end_name;
+        }
+
+        /* find the distinguished named type */
+        for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
+        {
+            if (dn_type == g_dn_types[i])
+            {
+                if (dn[i] == NULL)
+                {
+                    dn[i] = tmp;
+                    found = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (found == 0) /* not found so get rid of it */
+        {
+            free(tmp);
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = X509_OK;
+end_name:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the modulus and public exponent of a certificate.
+ */
+static int asn1_public_key(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK, mod_len, pub_len;
+    uint8_t *modulus, *pub_exp;
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
+            asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+            asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_BIT_STRING) < 0)
+        goto end_pub_key;
+
+    (*offset)++;
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
+        goto end_pub_key;
+
+    mod_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &modulus);
+    pub_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &pub_exp);
+
+    RSA_pub_key_new(&x509_ctx->rsa_ctx, modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len);
+
+    free(modulus);
+    free(pub_exp);
+    ret = X509_OK;
+
+end_pub_key:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+/**
+ * Read the signature of the certificate.
+ */
+static int asn1_signature(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
+
+    if (cert[(*offset)++] != ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+        goto end_sig;
+
+    x509_ctx->sig_len = get_asn1_length(cert, offset);
+    x509_ctx->signature = (uint8_t *)malloc(x509_ctx->sig_len);
+    memcpy(x509_ctx->signature, &cert[*offset], x509_ctx->sig_len);
+    *offset += x509_ctx->sig_len;
+    ret = X509_OK;
+
+end_sig:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare 2 distinguished name components for equality 
+ * @return 0 if a match
+ */
+static int asn1_compare_dn_comp(const char *dn1, const char *dn2)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if ((dn1 && dn2 == NULL) || (dn1 == NULL && dn2)) goto err_no_match;
+
+    ret = (dn1 && dn2) ? strcmp(dn1, dn2) : 0;
+
+err_no_match:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clean up all of the CA certificates.
+ */
+void remove_ca_certs(CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+
+    while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
+    {
+        x509_free(ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]);
+        ca_cert_ctx->cert[i++] = NULL;
+    }
+
+    free(ca_cert_ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare 2 distinguished names for equality 
+ * @return 0 if a match
+ */
+static int asn1_compare_dn(char * const dn1[], char * const dn2[])
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
+    {
+        if (asn1_compare_dn_comp(dn1[i], dn2[i]))
+        {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;       /* all good */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Retrieve the signature from a certificate.
+ */
+const uint8_t *x509_get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
+{
+    int offset = 0;
+    const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 || 
+            asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE))
+        goto end_get_sig;
+
+    if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+        goto end_get_sig;
+    *len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset);
+    ptr = &asn1_sig[offset];          /* all ok */
+
+end_get_sig:
+    return ptr;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Read the signature type of the certificate. We only support RSA-MD5 and
+ * RSA-SHA1 signature types.
+ */
+static int asn1_signature_type(const uint8_t *cert, 
+                                int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK, len;
+
+    if (cert[(*offset)++] != ASN1_OID)
+        goto end_check_sig;
+
+    len = get_asn1_length(cert, offset);
+
+    if (memcmp(sig_oid_prefix, &cert[*offset], SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE))
+        goto end_check_sig;     /* unrecognised cert type */
+
+    x509_ctx->sig_type = cert[*offset + SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE];
+
+    *offset += len;
+    if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_NULL))
+        goto end_check_sig;
+    ret = X509_OK;
+
+end_check_sig:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Construct a new x509 object.
+ * @return 0 if ok. < 0 if there was a problem.
+ */
+int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx)
+{
+    int begin_tbs, end_tbs;
+    int ret = X509_NOT_OK, offset = 0, cert_size = 0;
+    X509_CTX *x509_ctx;
+    BI_CTX *bi_ctx;
+
+    *ctx = (X509_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(X509_CTX));
+    x509_ctx = *ctx;
+
+    /* get the certificate size */
+    asn1_skip_obj(cert, &cert_size, ASN1_SEQUENCE); 
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
+        goto end_cert;
+
+    begin_tbs = offset;         /* start of the tbs */
+    end_tbs = begin_tbs;        /* work out the end of the tbs */
+    asn1_skip_obj(cert, &end_tbs, ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+
+    if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
+        goto end_cert;
+
+    if (cert[offset] == ASN1_EXPLICIT_TAG)   /* optional version */
+    {
+        if (asn1_version(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
+            goto end_cert;
+    }
+
+    if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_INTEGER) || /* serial number */ 
+            asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
+        goto end_cert;
+
+    /* make sure the signature is ok */
+    if (asn1_signature_type(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
+        goto end_cert;
+    }
+
+    if (asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn) || 
+            asn1_validity(cert, &offset, x509_ctx) ||
+            asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->cert_dn) ||
+            asn1_public_key(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
+        goto end_cert;
+
+    bi_ctx = x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION /* only care if doing verification */
+    /* use the appropriate signature algorithm (either SHA1 or MD5) */
+    if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_MD5)
+    {
+        MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
+        uint8_t md5_dgst[MD5_SIZE];
+        MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
+        MD5Update(&md5_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs);
+        MD5Final(&md5_ctx, md5_dgst);
+        x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, md5_dgst, MD5_SIZE);
+    }
+    else if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_SHA1)
+    {
+        SHA1_CTX sha_ctx;
+        uint8_t sha_dgst[SHA1_SIZE];
+        SHA1Init(&sha_ctx);
+        SHA1Update(&sha_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs);
+        SHA1Final(&sha_ctx, sha_dgst);
+        x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, sha_dgst, SHA1_SIZE);
+    }
+
+    offset = end_tbs;   /* skip the v3 data */
+    if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) || 
+            asn1_signature(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
+        goto end_cert;
+#endif
+
+    if (len)
+    {
+        *len = cert_size;
+    }
+
+    ret = X509_OK;
+end_cert:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+    if (ret)
+    {
+        printf("Error: Invalid X509 ASN.1 file\n");
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Free an X.509 object's resources.
+ */
+void x509_free(X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+    X509_CTX *next;
+    int i;
+
+    if (x509_ctx == NULL)       /* if already null, then don't bother */
+        return;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
+    {
+        free(x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[i]);
+        free(x509_ctx->cert_dn[i]);
+    }
+
+    free(x509_ctx->signature);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION 
+    if (x509_ctx->digest)
+    {
+        bi_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx, x509_ctx->digest);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    RSA_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx);
+
+    next = x509_ctx->next;
+    free(x509_ctx);
+    x509_free(next);        /* clear the chain */
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+/**
+ * Do some basic checks on the certificate chain.
+ *
+ * Certificate verification consists of a number of checks:
+ * - A root certificate exists in the certificate store.
+ * - The date of the certificate is after the start date.
+ * - The date of the certificate is before the finish date.
+ * - The certificate chain is valid.
+ * - That the certificate(s) are not self-signed.
+ * - The signature of the certificate is valid.
+ */
+int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert) 
+{
+    int ret = X509_OK, i = 0;
+    bigint *cert_sig;
+    X509_CTX *next_cert = NULL;
+    BI_CTX *ctx;
+    bigint *mod, *expn;
+    struct timeval tv;
+    int match_ca_cert = 0;
+
+    if (cert == NULL || ca_cert_ctx == NULL)
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;       
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* last cert in the chain - look for a trusted cert */
+    if (cert->next == NULL)
+    {
+        while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
+        {
+            if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn,
+                                        ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->cert_dn) == 0)
+            {
+                match_ca_cert = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            i++;
+        }
+
+        if (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
+        {
+            next_cert = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i];
+        }
+        else    /* trusted cert not found */
+        {
+            ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;       
+            goto end_verify;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        next_cert = cert->next;
+    }
+
+    gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+    /* check the not before date */
+    if (tv.tv_sec < cert->not_before)
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID;
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* check the not after date */
+    if (tv.tv_sec > cert->not_after)
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED;
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* check the chain integrity */
+    if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, next_cert->cert_dn))
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN;
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* check for self-signing */
+    if (!match_ca_cert && asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, cert->cert_dn) == 0)
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED;
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* check the signature */
+    ctx = cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
+    mod = next_cert->rsa_ctx->m;
+    expn = next_cert->rsa_ctx->e;
+    cert_sig = RSA_sign_verify(ctx, cert->signature, cert->sig_len, 
+            bi_clone(ctx, mod), bi_clone(ctx, expn));
+
+    if (cert_sig)
+    {
+        ret = cert->digest ?    /* check the signature */
+            bi_compare(cert_sig, cert->digest) :
+            X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
+        bi_free(ctx, cert_sig);
+
+        if (ret)
+            goto end_verify;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+        goto end_verify;
+    }
+
+    /* go down the certificate chain using recursion. */
+    if (ret == 0 && cert->next)
+    {
+        ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert);
+    }
+
+end_verify:
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined (CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
+/**
+ * Used for diagnostics.
+ */
+void x509_print(CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert) 
+{
+    if (cert == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    printf("----------------   CERT DEBUG   ----------------\n");
+    printf("* CA Cert Distinguished Name\n");
+    if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME])
+    {
+        printf("Common Name (CN):\t%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME]);
+    }
+
+    if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION])
+    {
+        printf("Organization (O):\t%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION]);
+    }
+
+    if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE])
+    {
+        printf("Organizational Unit (OU): %s\n", 
+                cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE]);
+    }
+
+    printf("* Cert Distinguished Name\n");
+    if (cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME])
+    {
+        printf("Common Name (CN):\t%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME]);
+    }
+
+    if (cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION])
+    {
+        printf("Organization (O):\t%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION]);
+    }
+
+    if (cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE])
+    {
+        printf("Organizational Unit (OU): %s\n", 
+                cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE]);
+    }
+
+    printf("Not Before:\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_before));
+    printf("Not After:\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_after));
+    printf("RSA bitsize:\t\t%d\n", cert->rsa_ctx->num_octets*8);
+    printf("Sig Type:\t\t");
+    switch (cert->sig_type)
+    {
+        case SIG_TYPE_MD5:
+            printf("MD5\n");
+            break;
+        case SIG_TYPE_SHA1:
+            printf("SHA1\n");
+            break;
+        case SIG_TYPE_MD2:
+            printf("MD2\n");
+            break;
+        default:
+            printf("Unrecognized: %d\n", cert->sig_type);
+            break;
+    }
+
+    printf("Verify:\t\t\t");
+
+    if (ca_cert_ctx)
+    {
+        x509_display_error(x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, cert));
+    }
+
+    printf("\n");
+#if 0
+    print_blob("Signature", cert->signature, cert->sig_len);
+    bi_print("Modulus", cert->rsa_ctx->m);
+    bi_print("Pub Exp", cert->rsa_ctx->e);
+#endif
+
+    if (ca_cert_ctx)
+    {
+        x509_print(ca_cert_ctx, cert->next);
+    }
+}
+
+void x509_display_error(int error)
+{
+    switch (error)
+    {
+        case X509_NOT_OK:
+            printf("X509 not ok");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT:
+            printf("No trusted cert is available");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+            printf("Bad signature");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID:
+            printf("Cert is not yet valid");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED:
+            printf("Cert has expired");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED:
+            printf("Cert is self-signed");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN:
+            printf("Chain is invalid (check order of certs)");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST:
+            printf("Unsupported digest");
+            break;
+
+        case X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY:
+            printf("Invalid private key");
+            break;
+    }
+}
+#endif      /* CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.c b/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.c
index 253707e7..2551f593 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.c
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.c
@@ -77,23 +77,14 @@ static void check(const bigint *bi);
  */
 BI_CTX *bi_initialize(void)
 {
+    /* calloc() sets everything to zero */
     BI_CTX *ctx = (BI_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(BI_CTX));
-
-    ctx->active_list = NULL;
-    ctx->active_count = 0;
-    ctx->free_list = NULL;
-    ctx->free_count = 0;
-    ctx->mod_offset = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_MONTGOMERY
-    ctx->use_classical = 0;
-#endif
-
+   
     /* the radix */
     ctx->bi_radix = alloc(ctx, 2); 
     ctx->bi_radix->comps[0] = 0;
     ctx->bi_radix->comps[1] = 1;
     bi_permanent(ctx->bi_radix);
-
     return ctx;
 }
 
@@ -285,7 +276,7 @@ bigint *bi_add(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bia, bigint *bib)
  * @param bia [in]  A bigint.
  * @param bib [in]  Another bigint.
  * @param is_negative [out] If defined, indicates that the result was negative.
- * is_negative may be NULL.
+ * is_negative may be null.
  * @return The result of the subtraction. The result is always positive.
  */
 bigint *bi_subtract(BI_CTX *ctx, 
@@ -482,7 +473,7 @@ bigint *bi_divide(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *u, bigint *v, int is_mod)
 /*
  * Perform an integer divide on a bigint.
  */
-static bigint *bi_int_divide(__unused BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *biR, comp denom)
+static bigint *bi_int_divide(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *biR, comp denom)
 {
     int i = biR->size - 1;
     long_comp r = 0;
@@ -781,7 +772,9 @@ void bi_free_mod(BI_CTX *ctx, int mod_offset)
  */
 static bigint *regular_multiply(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bia, bigint *bib)
 {
-    int i, j, i_plus_j, n = bia->size, t = bib->size;
+    int i, j, i_plus_j;
+    int n = bia->size; 
+    int t = bib->size;
     bigint *biR = alloc(ctx, n + t);
     comp *sr = biR->comps;
     comp *sa = bia->comps;
@@ -1059,7 +1052,7 @@ static bigint *alloc(BI_CTX *ctx, int size)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
             printf("alloc: refs was not 0\n");
 #endif
-            abort();
+            abort();    /* create a stack trace from a core dump */
         }
 
         more_comps(biR, size);
@@ -1220,7 +1213,7 @@ static bigint *comp_mod(bigint *bi, int mod)
 /*
  * Barrett reduction has no need for some parts of the product, so ignore bits
  * of the multiply. This routine gives Barrett its big performance
- * improvements over classical/Montgomery reduction methods. 
+ * improvements over Classical/Montgomery reduction methods. 
  */
 static bigint *partial_multiply(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bia, bigint *bib, 
         int inner_partial, int outer_partial)
@@ -1293,10 +1286,10 @@ static bigint *partial_multiply(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bia, bigint *bib,
 }
 
 /**
- * @brief Perform a single barrett reduction.
+ * @brief Perform a single Barrett reduction.
  * @param ctx [in]  The bigint session context.
  * @param bi [in]  A bigint.
- * @return The result of the barrett reduction.
+ * @return The result of the Barrett reduction.
  */
 bigint *bi_barrett(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bi)
 {
@@ -1308,7 +1301,7 @@ bigint *bi_barrett(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bi)
     check(bi);
     check(bim);
 
-    /* use classical method instead  - Barrett cannot help here */
+    /* use Classical method instead  - Barrett cannot help here */
     if (bi->size > k*2)
     {
         return bi_mod(ctx, bi);
@@ -1397,9 +1390,7 @@ bigint *bi_mod_power(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bi, bigint *biexp)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_SLIDING_WINDOW
     for (j = i; j > 32; j /= 5) /* work out an optimum size */
-    {
         window_size++;
-    }
 
     /* work out the slide constants */
     precompute_slide_window(ctx, window_size, bi);
@@ -1420,15 +1411,11 @@ bigint *bi_mod_power(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bi, bigint *biexp)
             int part_exp = 0;
 
             if (l < 0)  /* LSB of exponent will always be 1 */
-            {
                 l = 0;
-            }
             else
             {
                 while (exp_bit_is_one(biexp, l) == 0)
-                {
                     l++;    /* go back up */
-                }
             }
 
             /* build up the section of the exponent */
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.h b/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.h
index e233d798..5a13c5ae 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.h
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/bigint.h
@@ -74,14 +74,14 @@ bigint *bi_str_import(BI_CTX *ctx, const char *data);
  * appropriate reduction technique (which is bi_mod() when doing classical
  * reduction).
  */
-#if defined(CONFIG_BIGINT_CLASSICAL)
-#define bi_residue(A, B)         bi_mod(A, B)
+#if defined(CONFIG_BIGINT_MONTGOMERY)
+#define bi_residue(A, B)         bi_mont(A, B)
+bigint *bi_mont(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bixy);
 #elif defined(CONFIG_BIGINT_BARRETT)
 #define bi_residue(A, B)         bi_barrett(A, B)
 bigint *bi_barrett(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bi);
-#else   /* CONFIG_BIGINT_MONTGOMERY */
-#define bi_residue(A, B)         bi_mont(A, B)
-bigint *bi_mont(BI_CTX *ctx, bigint *bixy);
+#else /* if defined(CONFIG_BIGINT_CLASSICAL) */
+#define bi_residue(A, B)         bi_mod(A, B)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_SQUARE
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/crypto.h b/src/crypto/axtls/crypto.h
index 855282fa..de1dbeb4 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/crypto.h
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/crypto.h
@@ -54,9 +54,7 @@ void AES_set_key(AES_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
 void AES_cbc_encrypt(AES_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, 
         uint8_t *out, int length);
 void AES_cbc_decrypt(AES_CTX *ks, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, int length);
-#if 0 /** currently unused function **/
 void AES_convert_key(AES_CTX *ctx);
-#endif
 
 /**************************************************************************
  * RC4 declarations 
@@ -126,7 +124,12 @@ void hmac_sha1(const uint8_t *msg, int length, const uint8_t *key,
 void RNG_initialize(const uint8_t *seed_buf, int size);
 void RNG_terminate(void);
 void get_random(int num_rand_bytes, uint8_t *rand_data);
-void get_random_NZ(int num_rand_bytes, uint8_t *rand_data);
+//void get_random_NZ(int num_rand_bytes, uint8_t *rand_data);
+
+#include <string.h>
+static inline void get_random_NZ(int num_rand_bytes, uint8_t *rand_data) {
+	memset ( rand_data, 0x01, num_rand_bytes );
+}
 
 /**************************************************************************
  * RSA declarations 
@@ -165,15 +168,15 @@ void RSA_pub_key_new(RSA_CTX **rsa_ctx,
         const uint8_t *modulus, int mod_len,
         const uint8_t *pub_exp, int pub_len);
 void RSA_free(RSA_CTX *ctx);
-int RSA_decrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
+int RSA_decrypt(const RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
         int is_decryption);
-bigint *RSA_private(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg);
+bigint *RSA_private(const RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
 bigint *RSA_raw_sign_verify(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg);
 bigint *RSA_sign_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
         bigint *modulus, bigint *pub_exp);
-bigint *RSA_public(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg);
-int RSA_encrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len, 
+bigint *RSA_public(const RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg);
+int RSA_encrypt(const RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len, 
         uint8_t *out_data, int is_signing);
 void RSA_print(const RSA_CTX *ctx);
 #endif
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/os_port.h b/src/crypto/axtls/os_port.h
index 39e0fb54..babdbfad 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/os_port.h
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/os_port.h
@@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ static inline void close ( int fd __unused ) {
 }
 
 typedef void FILE;
-#define SEEK_SET 0
-#define SEEK_CUR 0
-#define SEEK_END 0
 
 static inline FILE * fopen ( const char *filename __unused,
 			     const char *mode __unused ) {
diff --git a/src/crypto/axtls/rsa.c b/src/crypto/axtls/rsa.c
index 69db9ae7..389eda57 100644
--- a/src/crypto/axtls/rsa.c
+++ b/src/crypto/axtls/rsa.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #include "crypto.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
-static bigint *bi_crt(RSA_CTX *rsa, bigint *bi);
+static bigint *bi_crt(const RSA_CTX *rsa, bigint *bi);
 #endif
 
 void RSA_priv_key_new(RSA_CTX **ctx, 
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void RSA_pub_key_new(RSA_CTX **ctx,
 {
     RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx;
     BI_CTX *bi_ctx = bi_initialize();
-    *ctx = (RSA_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(RSA_CTX));   /* reset to all 0 */
+    *ctx = (RSA_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(RSA_CTX));
     rsa_ctx = *ctx;
     rsa_ctx->bi_ctx = bi_ctx;
     rsa_ctx->num_octets = (mod_len & 0xFFF0);
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx)
  * @return  The number of bytes that were originally encrypted. -1 on error.
  * @see http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125
  */
-int RSA_decrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
-        int is_decryption)
+int RSA_decrypt(const RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, 
+                            uint8_t *out_data, int is_decryption)
 {
     int byte_size = ctx->num_octets;
     uint8_t *block;
@@ -155,10 +155,9 @@ int RSA_decrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
     if (is_decryption == 0) /* PKCS1.5 signing pads with "0xff"s */
     {
         while (block[i++] == 0xff && i < byte_size);
+
         if (block[i-2] != 0xff)
-        {
             i = byte_size;     /*ensure size is 0 */   
-        }
     }
     else                    /* PKCS1.5 encryption padding is random */
 #endif
@@ -169,9 +168,7 @@ int RSA_decrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
 
     /* get only the bit we want */
     if (size > 0)
-    {
         memcpy(out_data, &block[i], size);
-    }
     
     free(block);
     return size ? size : -1;
@@ -180,7 +177,7 @@ int RSA_decrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint8_t *out_data,
 /**
  * Performs m = c^d mod n
  */
-bigint *RSA_private(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg)
+bigint *RSA_private(const RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
     return bi_crt(c, bi_msg);
@@ -197,7 +194,7 @@ bigint *RSA_private(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg)
  * This should really be in bigint.c (and was at one stage), but needs 
  * access to the RSA_CTX context...
  */
-static bigint *bi_crt(RSA_CTX *rsa, bigint *bi)
+static bigint *bi_crt(const RSA_CTX *rsa, bigint *bi)
 {
     BI_CTX *ctx = rsa->bi_ctx;
     bigint *m1, *m2, *h;
@@ -245,7 +242,7 @@ void RSA_print(const RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx)
 /**
  * Performs c = m^e mod n
  */
-bigint *RSA_public(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg)
+bigint *RSA_public(const RSA_CTX * c, bigint *bi_msg)
 {
     c->bi_ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
     return bi_mod_power(c->bi_ctx, bi_msg, c->e);
@@ -255,7 +252,7 @@ bigint *RSA_public(RSA_CTX *c, bigint *bi_msg)
  * Use PKCS1.5 for encryption/signing.
  * see http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125
  */
-int RSA_encrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len, 
+int RSA_encrypt(const RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len, 
         uint8_t *out_data, int is_signing)
 {
     int byte_size = ctx->num_octets;
@@ -273,10 +270,7 @@ int RSA_encrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len,
     else /* randomize the encryption padding with non-zero bytes */   
     {
         out_data[1] = 2;
-        memset(&out_data[2], 0x01, num_pads_needed);
-#if 0
         get_random_NZ(num_pads_needed, &out_data[2]);
-#endif
     }
 
     out_data[2+num_pads_needed] = 0;
@@ -291,18 +285,19 @@ int RSA_encrypt(RSA_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in_data, uint16_t in_len,
 }
 
 #if 0
-
 /**
  * Take a signature and decrypt it.
  */
 bigint *RSA_sign_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
         bigint *modulus, bigint *pub_exp)
 {
-    uint8_t *block = (uint8_t *)malloc(sig_len);
+    uint8_t *block;
     int i, size;
     bigint *decrypted_bi, *dat_bi;
     bigint *bir = NULL;
 
+    block = (uint8_t *)malloc(sig_len);
+
     /* decrypt */
     dat_bi = bi_import(ctx, sig, sig_len);
     ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
@@ -332,7 +327,6 @@ bigint *RSA_sign_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
     free(block);
     return bir;
 }
-
 #endif
 
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION */