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* [build] Mark core files as permitted for UEFI Secure BootMichael Brown2026-01-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Mark all files used in a standard build of bin-x86_64-efi/snponly.efi as permitted for UEFI Secure Boot. These files represent the core functionality of iPXE that is guaranteed to have been included in every binary that was previously subject to a security review and signed by Microsoft. It is therefore legitimate to assume that at least these files have already been reviewed to the required standard multiple times. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Formalise mechanism for accessing absolute symbolsMichael Brown2025-05-091-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In a position-dependent executable, where all addresses are fixed at link time, we can use the standard technique as documented by GNU ld to get the value of an absolute symbol, e.g.: extern char _my_symbol[]; printf ( "Absolute symbol value is %x\n", ( ( int ) _my_symbol ) ); This technique may not work in a position-independent executable. When dynamic relocations are applied, the runtime addresses will no longer be equal to the link-time addresses. If the code to obtain the address of _my_symbol uses PC-relative addressing, then it will calculate the runtime "address" of the absolute symbol, which will no longer be equal the the link-time "address" (i.e. the correct value) of the absolute symbol. Define macros ABS_SYMBOL(), ABS_VALUE_INIT(), and ABS_VALUE() that provide access to the correct values of absolute symbols even in position-independent code, and use these macros wherever absolute symbols are accessed. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [efi] Include Secure Boot Advanced Targeting (SBAT) metadataMichael Brown2022-01-131-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SBAT defines an encoding for security generation numbers stored as a CSV file within a special ".sbat" section in the signed binary. If a Secure Boot exploit is discovered then the generation number will be incremented alongside the corresponding fix. Platforms may then record the minimum generation number required for any given product. This allows for an efficient revocation mechanism that consumes minimal flash storage space (in contrast to the DBX mechanism, which allows for only a single-digit number of revocation events to ever take place across all possible signed binaries). Add SBAT metadata to iPXE EFI binaries to support this mechanism. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [legal] Relicense files under GPL2_OR_LATER_OR_UBDLMichael Brown2015-03-021-1/+5
| | | | | | | Relicense files for which I am the sole author (as identified by util/relicense.pl). Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Move branding information to config/branding.hMichael Brown2015-02-111-0/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Expose build timestamp, build name, and product namesMichael Brown2014-06-241-1/+49
| | | | | | | | Expose the build timestamp (measured in seconds since the Epoch) and the build name (e.g. "rtl8139.rom" or "ipxe.efi"), and provide the product name and product short name in a single centralised location. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
* [build] Include version number within only a single object fileMichael Brown2012-11-021-0/+41
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>