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Some past security reviews carried out for UEFI Secure Boot signing
submissions have covered specific drivers or functional areas of iPXE.
Mark all of the files comprising these areas as permitted for UEFI
Secure Boot.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The GCM cipher mode of operation (in common with other counter-based
modes of operation) has a notion of blocksize that does not neatly
fall into our current abstraction: it does operate in 16-byte blocks
but allows for an arbitrary overall data length (i.e. the final block
may be incomplete).
Model this by adding a concept of alignment size. Each call to
encrypt() or decrypt() must begin at a multiple of the alignment size
from the start of the data stream. This allows us to model GCM by
using a block size of 1 byte and an alignment size of 16 bytes.
As a side benefit, this same concept allows us to neatly model the
fact that raw AES can encrypt only a single 16-byte block, by
specifying an alignment size of zero on this cipher.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Some ciphers (such as GCM) support the concept of a tag that can be
used to authenticate the encrypted data. Add a cipher method for
generating an authentication tag.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Reported-by: James A. Peltier <jpeltier@sfu.ca>
Reported-by: Matthew Helton <mwhelton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Replace the AES implementation from AXTLS with a dedicated iPXE
implementation which is slightly smaller and around 1000% faster.
This implementation has been verified using the existing self-tests
based on the NIST AES test vectors.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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