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Some past security reviews carried out for UEFI Secure Boot signing
submissions have covered specific drivers or functional areas of iPXE.
Mark all of the files comprising these areas as permitted for UEFI
Secure Boot.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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We currently disable all external trust sources (such as the UEFI
TlsCaCertificate variable) if an explicit TRUST=... parameter is
provided on the build command line.
Define an explicit TRUST_EXT build parameter that can be used to
explicitly disable external trust sources even if no TRUST=...
parameter is provided, or to explicitly enable external trust sources
even if an explicit TRUST=... parameter is provided. For example:
# Default trusted root certificate, disable external sources
make TRUST_EXT=0
# Explicit trusted root certificate, enable external sources
make TRUST=custom.crt TRUST_EXT=1
If no TRUST_EXT parameter is specified, then continue to default to
disabling external trust sources if an explicit TRUST=... parameter is
provided, to maintain backwards compatibility with existing build
command lines.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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UEFI's built-in HTTPS boot mechanism requires the trusted CA
certificates to be provided via the TlsCaCertificates variable.
(There is no equivalent of the iPXE cross-signing mechanism, so it is
not possible for UEFI to automatically use public CA certificates.)
Users who have configured UEFI HTTPS boot to use a custom root of
trust (e.g. a private CA certificate) may find it useful to have iPXE
automatically pick up and use this same root of trust, so that iPXE
can seamlessly fetch files via HTTPS from the same servers that were
trusted by UEFI HTTPS boot, in addition to servers that iPXE can
validate through other means such as cross-signed certificates.
Parse the TlsCaCertificates variable at startup, add any certificates
to the certificate store, and mark these certificates as trusted.
There are no access restrictions on modifying the TlsCaCertificates
variable: anybody with access to write UEFI variables is permitted to
change the root of trust. The UEFI security model assumes that anyone
with access to run code prior to ExitBootServices() or with access to
modify UEFI variables from within a loaded operating system is
supposed to be able to change the system's root of trust for TLS.
Any certificates parsed from TlsCaCertificates will show up in the
output of "certstat", and may be discarded using "certfree" if
unwanted.
Support for parsing TlsCaCertificates is enabled by default in EFI
builds, but may be disabled in config/general.h if needed.
As with the ${trust} setting, the contents of the TlsCaCertificates
variable will be ignored if iPXE has been compiled with an explicit
root of trust by specifying TRUST=... on the build command line.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The intention of the existing code (as documented in its own comments)
is that it should be possible to override the list of trusted root
certificates using a "trust" setting held in non-volatile stored
options. However, the rootcert_init() function currently executes
before any devices have been probed, and so will not be able to
retrieve any such non-volatile stored options.
Fix by executing rootcert_init() only after devices have been probed.
Since startup functions may be executed multiple times (unlike
initialisation functions), add an explicit flag to preserve the
property that rootcert_init() should run only once.
As before, if an explicit root of trust is specified at build time,
then any runtime "trust" setting will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Relicense files for which I am the sole author (as identified by
util/relicense.pl).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The fetch_setting() family of functions may currently modify the
definition of the specified setting (e.g. to add missing type
information). Clean up this interface by requiring callers to provide
an explicit buffer to contain the completed definition of the fetched
setting, if required.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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fetch_settings_copy() currently returns success and a NULL data
pointer to indicate a non-existent setting. This is intended to allow
the caller to differentiate between a non-existent setting and an
error in allocating memory for the copy of the setting.
The underlying settings blocks' fetch() methods provide no way to
perform an existence check separate from an attempt to fetch the
setting. A "non-existent setting" therefore means simply a setting
for which an error was encountered when attempting to fetch from every
settings block within the subtree.
Since any underlying error within a settings block (e.g. a GuestRPC
failure when attempting to retrieve a VMware GuestInfo setting) will
produce the effect of a "non-existent setting", it seems somewhat
meaningless to give special treatment to memory allocation errors
within fetch_setting_copy().
Remove the special treatment and simplify the semantics of
fetch_setting_copy() by directly passing through any underlying error
(including non-existence) encountered while fetching the setting.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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If a root certificate has been explicitly specified at build time
using TRUST=/path/to/cert then do not allow this to be overridden even
from a trustworthy settings source (such as VMware GuestInfo).
Similarly, if a client certificate (and private key) has been
explicitly specified at build time, then do not allow it to be
overridden at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Changing the trusted root certificate currently requires a rebuild of
the iPXE binary, which may be inconvenient or impractical.
Allow the list of trusted root certificate fingerprints to be
overridden using the "trust" setting, but only at the point of iPXE
initialisation. This prevents untrusted sources of settings
(e.g. DHCP) from subverting the chain of trust, while allowing
trustworthy sources to change the trusted root certificate without
requiring a rebuild.
The basic idea is that if you are able to manipulate a trustworthy
source of settings (e.g. VMware GuestInfo or non-volatile stored
options), then you would be able to replace the iPXE binary anyway,
and so no security is lost by allowing such sources to override the
list of trusted root certificates.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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