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author | Catalin Marinas | 2010-09-13 17:03:21 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Russell King | 2010-11-04 16:44:31 +0100 |
commit | 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 (patch) | |
tree | e9e026b96597d080de4c16bb88c17b0495c61904 /arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S | |
parent | vmstat: fix offset calculation on void* (diff) | |
download | kernel-qcow2-linux-247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58.tar.gz kernel-qcow2-linux-247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58.tar.xz kernel-qcow2-linux-247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58.zip |
ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S index 7d63beaf9745..337f10256cd6 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S @@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ * 110x 0 1 0 r/w r/o * 11x0 0 1 0 r/w r/o * 1111 0 1 1 r/w r/w + * + * If !CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS, the following permissions are changed: + * 110x 1 1 1 r/o r/o + * 11x0 1 1 1 r/o r/o */ .macro armv6_mt_table pfx \pfx\()_mt_table: @@ -138,8 +142,11 @@ tst r1, #L_PTE_USER orrne r3, r3, #PTE_EXT_AP1 +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS + @ allow kernel read/write access to read-only user pages tstne r3, #PTE_EXT_APX bicne r3, r3, #PTE_EXT_APX | PTE_EXT_AP0 +#endif tst r1, #L_PTE_EXEC orreq r3, r3, #PTE_EXT_XN |