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| author | Kees Cook | 2012-10-15 23:02:07 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Rusty Russell | 2012-12-14 03:35:24 +0100 |
| commit | 2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839 (patch) | |
| tree | b8190d17aa5d59508f8c979ce0160f21bef89500 /include/linux/security.h | |
| parent | module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module() (diff) | |
| download | kernel-qcow2-linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.tar.gz kernel-qcow2-linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.tar.xz kernel-qcow2-linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.zip | |
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/security.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 05e88bdcf7d9..0f6afc657f77 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -694,6 +694,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_module_from_file: + * Load a kernel module from userspace. + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing + * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob, + * this argument will be NULL. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_fix_setuid: * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter @@ -1508,6 +1514,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); + int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file); int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); @@ -1765,6 +1772,7 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); +int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); @@ -2278,6 +2286,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) |