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authorEric W. Biederman2014-04-23 23:29:27 +0200
committerDavid S. Miller2014-04-24 19:44:54 +0200
commit90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e (patch)
tree85d43e6c5d8b10fb79fcb9c402217f8eb54bbe12 /net/decnet/netfilter
parentnet: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages (diff)
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net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/decnet/netfilter')
-rw-r--r--net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index e83015cecfa7..e4d9560a910b 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */