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-rw-r--r--lib/vsprintf.c98
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 791b6fa36905..eb7b4a06e1f0 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -717,6 +717,55 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+ struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ switch (kptr_restrict) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Always print %pK values */
+ break;
+ case 1: {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ /*
+ * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+ * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+ */
+ if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+ if (spec.field_width == -1)
+ spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+ return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+ * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+ * same credentials it started with. This is because
+ * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+ * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+ * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+ * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+ */
+ cred = current_cred();
+ if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 2:
+ default:
+ /* Always print 0's for %pK */
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+}
+
static noinline_for_stack
char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec,
const char *fmt)
@@ -1476,55 +1525,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
}
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
-
-static noinline_for_stack
-char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
- struct printf_spec spec)
-{
- switch (kptr_restrict) {
- case 0:
- /* Always print %pK values */
- break;
- case 1: {
- const struct cred *cred;
-
- /*
- * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
- * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
- */
- if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
- if (spec.field_width == -1)
- spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
- return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
- }
-
- /*
- * Only print the real pointer value if the current
- * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
- * same credentials it started with. This is because
- * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
- * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
- * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
- * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
- */
- cred = current_cred();
- if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
- !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
- !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- case 2:
- default:
- /* Always print 0's for %pK */
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
-
- return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
-}
-
static noinline_for_stack
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr,
struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt)