| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two fixes: a quirk for KVM guests running on certain AMD CPUs, and a
KASAN related build fix"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/CPU/AMD: Don't force the CPB cap when running under a hypervisor
x86/boot: Provide KASAN compatible aliases for string routines
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For F17h AMD CPUs, the CPB capability ('Core Performance Boost') is forcibly set,
because some versions of that chip incorrectly report that they do not have it.
However, a hypervisor may filter out the CPB capability, for good
reasons. For example, KVM currently does not emulate setting the CPB
bit in MSR_K7_HWCR, and unchecked MSR access errors will be thrown
when trying to set it as a guest:
unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010015 (tried to write 0x0000000001000011) at rIP: 0xffffffff890638f4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
Call Trace:
boost_set_msr+0x50/0x80 [acpi_cpufreq]
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x86/0x560
sort_range+0x20/0x20
cpuhp_thread_fun+0xb0/0x110
smpboot_thread_fn+0xef/0x160
kthread+0x113/0x130
kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
To avoid this issue, don't forcibly set the CPB capability for a CPU
when running under a hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com
Fixes: 0237199186e7 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Set the CPB bit unconditionally on F17h")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522221745.GA15789@dev-dsk-fllinden-2c-c1893d73.us-west-2.amazon.com
[ Minor edits to the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Four bug fixes, none 5.2-specific, all marked for stable.
The first two are related to the architecture specific IMA policy
support. The other two patches, one is related to EVM signatures,
based on additional hash algorithms, and the other is related to
displaying the IMA policy"
* 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly
evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising
x86/ima: Check EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES before using
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Checking efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) is not sufficient to ensure that
EFI runtime services are available, e.g. if efi=noruntime is used.
Without this, I get an oops on a PREEMPT_RT kernel where efi=noruntime is
the default.
Fixes: 399574c64eaf94e8 ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0)
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
subject to the gnu public license v 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 9 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171440.130801526@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
subject to the gnu general public license v2 only
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171439.275006521@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this copyrighted material is made available to anyone wishing to use
modify copy or redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions
of the gnu general public license v 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 45 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528170027.342746075@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this file may be distributed under the terms of the gnu general
public license version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 9 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070034.395589349@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 3 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version [author] [kishon] [vijay] [abraham]
[i] [kishon]@[ti] [com] this program is distributed in the hope that
it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see
the gnu general public license for more details
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version [author] [graeme] [gregory]
[gg]@[slimlogic] [co] [uk] [author] [kishon] [vijay] [abraham] [i]
[kishon]@[ti] [com] [based] [on] [twl6030]_[usb] [c] [author] [hema]
[hk] [hemahk]@[ti] [com] this program is distributed in the hope
that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the
implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1105 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.202006027@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation inc 675 mass ave cambridge ma 02139 usa
either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version
incorporated herein by reference
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190524100844.465381181@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 or at your option any
later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will
be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
general public license for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 44 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091651.032047323@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110 1301 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 50 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091649.499889647@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this code is released under the gnu general public license version 2
or later
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520075211.232210963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation 51
franklin street fifth floor boston ma 02110 1301 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 2 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154042.432790911@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details [based]
[from] [clk] [highbank] [c] you should have received a copy of the
gnu general public license along with this program if not see http
www gnu org licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 355 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154041.837383322@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, the Kbuild core manipulates header search paths in a crazy
way [1].
To fix this mess, I want all Makefiles to add explicit $(srctree)/ to
the search paths in the srctree. Some Makefiles are already written in
that way, but not all. The goal of this work is to make the notation
consistent, and finally get rid of the gross hacks.
Having whitespaces after -I does not matter since commit 48f6e3cf5bc6
("kbuild: do not drop -I without parameter").
[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9632347/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- support for SVE and Pointer Authentication in guests
- PMU improvements
POWER:
- support for direct access to the POWER9 XIVE interrupt controller
- memory and performance optimizations
x86:
- support for accessing memory not backed by struct page
- fixes and refactoring
Generic:
- dirty page tracking improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (155 commits)
kvm: fix compilation on aarch64
Revert "KVM: nVMX: Expose RDPMC-exiting only when guest supports PMU"
kvm: x86: Fix L1TF mitigation for shadow MMU
KVM: nVMX: Disable intercept for FS/GS base MSRs in vmcs02 when possible
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Remove useless checks in 'release' method of KVM device
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Fix spelling mistake "acessing" -> "accessing"
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make sure to load LPID for radix VCPUs
kvm: nVMX: Set nested_run_pending in vmx_set_nested_state after checks complete
tests: kvm: Add tests for KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
KVM: nVMX: KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE - Tear down old EVMCS state before setting new state
tests: kvm: Add tests for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS and KVM_CAP_MAX_CPU_ID
tests: kvm: Add tests to .gitignore
KVM: Introduce KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2
KVM: Fix kvm_clear_dirty_log_protect off-by-(minus-)one
KVM: Fix the bitmap range to copy during clear dirty
KVM: arm64: Fix ptrauth ID register masking logic
KVM: x86: use direct accessors for RIP and RSP
KVM: VMX: Use accessors for GPRs outside of dedicated caching logic
KVM: x86: Omit caching logic for always-available GPRs
kvm, x86: Properly check whether a pfn is an MMIO or not
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pfn_valid check is not sufficient because it only checks if a page has a struct
page or not, if "mem=" was passed to the kernel some valid pages won't have a
struct page. This means that if guests were assigned valid memory that lies
after the mem= boundary it will be passed uncached to the guest no matter what
the guest caching attributes are for this memory.
Introduce a new function e820__mapped_raw_any which is equivalent to
e820__mapped_any but uses the original e820 unmodified and use it to
identify real *RAM*.
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes and updates:
- a handful of MDS documentation/comment updates
- a cleanup related to hweight interfaces
- a SEV guest fix for large pages
- a kprobes LTO fix
- and a final cleanup commit for vDSO HPET support removal"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation/mds: Improve CPU buffer clear documentation
x86/speculation/mds: Revert CPU buffer clear on double fault exit
x86/kconfig: Disable CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT and remove __HAVE_ARCH_SW_HWEIGHT
x86/mm: Do not use set_{pud, pmd}_safe() when splitting a large page
x86/kprobes: Make trampoline_handler() global and visible
x86/vdso: Remove hpet_page from vDSO
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The double fault ESPFIX path doesn't return to user mode at all --
it returns back to the kernel by simulating a #GP fault.
prepare_exit_to_usermode() will run on the way out of
general_protection before running user code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 04dcbdb80578 ("x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac97612445c0a44ee10374f6ea79c222fe22a5c4.1557865329.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This function is referenced from assembler, so in LTO
it needs to be global and visible to not be optimized away.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-7-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt:
"The major changes in this tracing update includes:
- Removal of non-DYNAMIC_FTRACE from 32bit x86
- Removal of mcount support from x86
- Emulating a call from int3 on x86_64, fixes live kernel patching
- Consolidated Tracing Error logs file
Minor updates:
- Removal of klp_check_compiler_support()
- kdb ftrace dumping output changes
- Accessing and creating ftrace instances from inside the kernel
- Clean up of #define if macro
- Introduction of TRACE_EVENT_NOP() to disable trace events based on
config options
And other minor fixes and clean ups"
* tag 'trace-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (44 commits)
x86: Hide the int3_emulate_call/jmp functions from UML
livepatch: Remove klp_check_compiler_support()
ftrace/x86: Remove mcount support
ftrace/x86_32: Remove support for non DYNAMIC_FTRACE
tracing: Simplify "if" macro code
tracing: Fix documentation about disabling options using trace_options
tracing: Replace kzalloc with kcalloc
tracing: Fix partial reading of trace event's id file
tracing: Allow RCU to run between postponed startup tests
tracing: Fix white space issues in parse_pred() function
tracing: Eliminate const char[] auto variables
ring-buffer: Fix mispelling of Calculate
tracing: probeevent: Fix to make the type of $comm string
tracing: probeevent: Do not accumulate on ret variable
tracing: uprobes: Re-enable $comm support for uprobe events
ftrace/x86_64: Emulate call function while updating in breakpoint handler
x86_64: Allow breakpoints to emulate call instructions
x86_64: Add gap to int3 to allow for call emulation
tracing: kdb: Allow ftdump to skip all but the last few entries
tracing: Add trace_total_entries() / trace_total_entries_cpu()
...
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There's two methods of enabling function tracing in Linux on x86. One is
with just "gcc -pg" and the other is "gcc -pg -mfentry". The former will use
calls to a special function "mcount" after the frame is set up in all C
functions. The latter will add calls to a special function called "fentry"
as the very first instruction of all C functions.
At compile time, there is a check to see if gcc supports, -mfentry, and if
it does, it will use that, because it is more versatile and less error prone
for function tracing.
Starting with v4.19, the minimum gcc supported to build the Linux kernel,
was raised to version 4.6. That also happens to be the first gcc version to
support -mfentry. Since on x86, using gcc versions from 4.6 and beyond will
unconditionally enable the -mfentry, it will no longer use mcount as the
method for inserting calls into the C functions of the kernel. This means
that there is no point in continuing to maintain mcount in x86.
Remove support for using mcount. This makes the code less complex, and will
also allow it to be simplified in the future.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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When DYNAMIC_FTRACE is enabled in the kernel, all the functions that can be
traced by the function tracer have a "nop" placeholder at the start of the
function. When function tracing is enabled, the nop is converted into a call
to the tracing infrastructure where the functions get traced. This also
allows for specifying specific functions to trace, and a lot of
infrastructure is built on top of this.
When DYNAMIC_FTRACE is not enabled, all the functions have a call to the
ftrace trampoline. A check is made to see if a function pointer is the
ftrace_stub or not, and if it is not, it calls the function pointer to trace
the code. This adds over 10% overhead to the kernel even when tracing is
disabled.
When an architecture supports DYNAMIC_FTRACE there really is no reason to
use the static tracing. I have kept non DYNAMIC_FTRACE available in x86 so
that the generic code for non DYNAMIC_FTRACE can be tested. There is no
reason to support non DYNAMIC_FTRACE for both x86_64 and x86_32. As the non
DYNAMIC_FTRACE for x86_32 does not even support fentry, and we want to
remove mcount completely, there's no reason to keep non DYNAMIC_FTRACE
around for x86_32.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Nicolai Stange discovered[1] that if live kernel patching is enabled, and the
function tracer started tracing the same function that was patched, the
conversion of the fentry call site during the translation of going from
calling the live kernel patch trampoline to the iterator trampoline, would
have as slight window where it didn't call anything.
As live kernel patching depends on ftrace to always call its code (to
prevent the function being traced from being called, as it will redirect
it). This small window would allow the old buggy function to be called, and
this can cause undesirable results.
Nicolai submitted new patches[2] but these were controversial. As this is
similar to the static call emulation issues that came up a while ago[3].
But after some debate[4][5] adding a gap in the stack when entering the
breakpoint handler allows for pushing the return address onto the stack to
easily emulate a call.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180726104029.7736-1-nstange@suse.de
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190427100639.15074-1-nstange@suse.de
[3] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3cf04e113d71c9f8e4be95fb84a510f085aa4afa.1541711457.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[4] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wh5OpheSU8Em_Q3Hg8qw_JtoijxOdPtHru6d+5K8TWM=A@mail.gmail.com
[5] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjvQxY4DvPrJ6haPgAa6b906h=MwZXO6G8OtiTGe=N7_w@mail.gmail.com
[
Live kernel patching is not implemented on x86_32, thus the emulate
calls are only for x86_64.
]
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b700e7f03df5 ("livepatch: kernel: add support for live patching")
Tested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
[ Changed to only implement emulated calls for x86_64 ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull more power management updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix a recent regression causing kernels built with CONFIG_PM
unset to crash on systems that support the Performance and Energy Bias
Hint (EPB), clean up the cpufreq core and some users of transition
notifiers and introduce a new power domain flag into the generic power
domains framework (genpd).
Specifics:
- Fix recent regression causing kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset to
crash on systems that support the Performance and Energy Bias Hint
(EPB) by avoiding to compile the EPB-related code depending on
CONFIG_PM when it is unset (Rafael Wysocki).
- Clean up the transition notifier invocation code in the cpufreq
core and change some users of cpufreq transition notifiers
accordingly (Viresh Kumar).
- Change MAINTAINERS to cover the schedutil governor as part of
cpufreq (Viresh Kumar).
- Simplify cpufreq_init_policy() to avoid redundant computations (Yue
Hu).
- Add explanatory comment to the cpufreq core (Rafael Wysocki).
- Introduce a new flag, GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON, to the generic
power domains (genpd) framework along with the first user of it
(Leonard Crestez)"
* tag 'pm-5.2-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
soc: imx: gpc: Use GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON for ERR009619
PM / Domains: Add GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON flag
cpufreq: Update MAINTAINERS to include schedutil governor
cpufreq: Don't find governor for setpolicy drivers in cpufreq_init_policy()
cpufreq: Explain the kobject_put() in cpufreq_policy_alloc()
cpufreq: Call transition notifier only once for each policy
x86: intel_epb: Take CONFIG_PM into account
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* pm-cpufreq:
cpufreq: Update MAINTAINERS to include schedutil governor
cpufreq: Don't find governor for setpolicy drivers in cpufreq_init_policy()
cpufreq: Explain the kobject_put() in cpufreq_policy_alloc()
cpufreq: Call transition notifier only once for each policy
* pm-domains:
soc: imx: gpc: Use GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON for ERR009619
PM / Domains: Add GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON flag
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Currently, the notifiers are called once for each CPU of the policy->cpus
cpumask. It would be more optimal if the notifier can be called only
once and all the relevant information be provided to it. Out of the 23
drivers that register for the transition notifiers today, only 4 of them
do per-cpu updates and the callback for the rest can be called only once
for the policy without any impact.
This would also avoid multiple function calls to the notifier callbacks
and reduce multiple iterations of notifier core's code (which does
locking as well).
This patch adds pointer to the cpufreq policy to the struct
cpufreq_freqs, so the notifier callback has all the information
available to it with a single call. The five drivers which perform
per-cpu updates are updated to use the cpufreq policy. The freqs->cpu
field is redundant now and is removed.
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (sparc)
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Commit b9c273babce7 ("PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs
interface") caused kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset to crash on
systems supporting the Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB),
because it attempts to add files to sysfs directories that don't
exist on those systems.
Prevent that from happening by taking CONFIG_PM into account so
that the code depending on it is not compiled at all when it is
not set.
Fixes: b9c273babce7 ("PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs interface")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
has the following CVEs assigned:
CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
this data via cache side channels.
Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
successfully.
The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
default to avoid breaking unattended updates.
The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
deeper technical view"
* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
...
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Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git
Pull in the command line updates from the tip tree so the MDS parts can be
added.
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This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.
For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.
However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:
$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated
But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
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s/L1TF/MDS/
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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MDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk
whenever SMT first gets enabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS
mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions
have been made.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with
SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.
Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.
This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
mds=[full|off]
This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.
Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.
The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.
When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.
When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.
Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.
This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:
- The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
to that new driver.
- The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on
VMENTER when updated microcode is installed.
If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then
MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicitly.
For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS
mitigation before VMENTER.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category. Also the
Silvermont/Airmont ATOMs, but for them it's not really relevant as they do
not support SMT, but mark them for completeness sake.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
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