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* cifs: handle errors from coalesce_t2Jeff Layton2011-05-031-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs_demultiplex_thread calls coalesce_t2 to try and merge follow-on t2 responses into the original mid buffer. coalesce_t2 however can return errors, but the caller doesn't handle that situation properly. Fix the thread to treat such a case as it would a malformed packet. Mark the mid as being malformed and issue the callback. Cc: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: refactor mid finding loop in cifs_demultiplex_threadJeff Layton2011-05-031-46/+46
| | | | | | | | | | ...to reduce the extreme indentation. This should introduce no behavioral changes. Cc: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: sanitize length checking in coalesce_t2 (try #3)Jeff Layton2011-04-291-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a couple of places in this code where these values can wrap or go negative, and that could potentially end up overflowing the buffer. Ensure that that doesn't happen. Do all of the length calculation and checks first, and only perform the memcpy after they pass. Also, increase some stack variables to 32 bits to ensure that they don't wrap without being detected. Finally, change the error codes to be a bit more descriptive of any problems detected. -EINVAL isn't very accurate. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_optionsPavel Shilovsky2011-04-211-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | While password processing we can get out of options array bound if the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check if we reach the end. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Warn on requesting default security (ntlm) on mountSteve French2011-04-121-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Warn once if default security (ntlm) requested. We will update the default to the stronger security mechanism (ntlmv2) in 2.6.41. Kerberos is also stronger than ntlm, but more servers support ntlmv2 and ntlmv2 does not require an upcall, so ntlmv2 is a better default. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGoodSteve French2011-04-121-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the TCP_Server_Info is first allocated and connected, tcpStatus == CifsGood means that the NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL request has completed and the socket is ready for other calls. cifs_reconnect however sets tcpStatus to CifsGood as soon as the socket is reconnected and the optional RFC1001 session setup is done. We have no clear way to tell the difference between these two states, and we need to know this in order to know whether we can send an echo or not. Resolve this by adding a new statusEnum value -- CifsNeedNegotiate. When the socket has been connected but has not yet had a NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL request done, set it to this value. Once the NEGOTIATE is done, cifs_negotiate_protocol will set tcpStatus to CifsGood. This also fixes and cleans the logic in cifs_reconnect and cifs_reconnect_tcon. The old code checked for specific states when what it really wants to know is whether the state has actually changed from CifsNeedReconnect. Reported-and-Tested-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up length checks in check2ndT2Jeff Layton2011-04-121-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Thus spake David Howells: The code that follows this: remaining = total_data_size - data_in_this_rsp; if (remaining == 0) return 0; else if (remaining < 0) { generates better code if you drop the 'remaining' variable and compare the values directly. Clean it up per his recommendation... Reported-and-acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mountJeff Layton2011-04-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath, so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for the mount. This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at mount time instead. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversionSteve French2011-04-121-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings: ~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ CHECK fs/cifs/connect.c fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Allow user names longer than 32 bytesSteve French2011-04-121-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi2011-03-311-2/+2
| | | | | | Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
* cifs: don't always drop malformed replies on the floor (try #3)Jeff Layton2011-02-111-6/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Slight revision to this patch...use min_t() instead of conditional assignment. Also, remove the FIXME comment and replace it with the explanation that Steve gave earlier. After receiving a packet, we currently check the header. If it's no good, then we toss it out and continue the loop, leaving the caller waiting on that response. In cases where the packet has length inconsistencies, but the MID is valid, this leads to unneeded delays. That's especially problematic now that the client waits indefinitely for responses. Instead, don't immediately discard the packet if checkSMB fails. Try to find a matching mid_q_entry, mark it as having a malformed response and issue the callback. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up checks in cifs_echo_requestJeff Layton2011-02-101-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | Follow-on patch to 7e90d705 which is already in Steve's tree... The check for tcpStatus == CifsGood is not meaningful since it doesn't indicate whether the NEGOTIATE request has been done. Also, clarify why we're checking for maxBuf == 0. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Do not send SMBEcho requests on new sockets until SMBNegotiateSteve French2011-02-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | In order to determine whether an SMBEcho request can be sent we need to know that the socket is established (server tcpStatus == CifsGood) AND that an SMB NegotiateProtocol has been sent (server maxBuf != 0). Without the second check we can send an Echo request during reconnection before the server can accept it. CC: JG <jg@cms.ac> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: don't send an echo request unless NegProt has been doneJeff Layton2011-02-051-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the socket to the server is disconnected, the client more or less immediately calls cifs_reconnect to reconnect the socket. The NegProt and SessSetup however are not done until an actual call needs to be made. With the addition of the SMB echo code, it's possible that the server will initiate a disconnect on an idle socket. The client will then reconnect the socket but no NegotiateProtocol request is done. The SMBEcho workqueue job will then eventually pop, and an SMBEcho will be sent on the socket. The server will then reject it since no NegProt was done. The ideal fix would be to either have the socket not be reconnected until we plan to use it, or to immediately do a NegProt when the reconnect occurs. The code is not structured for this however. For now we must just settle for not sending any echoes until the NegProt is done. Reported-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Possible slab memory corruption while updating extended stats (repost)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-02-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Updating extended statistics here can cause slab memory corruption if a callback function frees slab memory (mid_entry). Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix length vs. total_read confusion in cifs_demultiplex_threadJeff Layton2011-02-021-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | length at this point is the length returned by the last kernel_recvmsg call. total_read is the length of all of the data read so far. length is more or less meaningless at this point, so use total_read for everything. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: More crypto cleanup (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-01-271-4/+2Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in file md4.c are not needed anymore. Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations, and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included. Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Add strictcache mount optionPavel Shilovsky2011-01-251-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Use for switching on strict cache mode. In this mode the client reads from the cache all the time it has Oplock Level II, otherwise - read from the server. As for write - the client stores a data in the cache in Exclusive Oplock case, otherwise - write directly to the server. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Make CIFS mount work in a container.Rob Landley2011-01-241-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix unaligned access in check2ndT2 and coalesce_t2Jeff Layton2011-01-201-19/+14Star
| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: use get/put_unaligned functions to access ByteCountJeff Layton2011-01-201-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that when we access the ByteCount that the alignment will be off. Most CPUs deal with that transparently, but there's usually some performance impact. Some CPUs raise an exception on unaligned accesses. Fix this by accessing the byte count using the get_unaligned and put_unaligned inlined functions. While we're at it, fix the types of some of the variables that end up getting returns from these functions. Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: remove code for setting timeouts on requestsJeff Layton2011-01-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Since we don't time out individual requests anymore, remove the code that we used to use for setting timeouts on different requests. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] cifs: reconnect unresponsive serversSteve French2011-01-201-4/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the server isn't responding to echoes, we don't want to leave tasks hung waiting for it to reply. At that point, we'll want to reconnect so that soft mounts can return an error to userspace quickly. If the client hasn't received a reply after a specified number of echo intervals, assume that the transport is down and attempt to reconnect the socket. The number of echo_intervals to wait before attempting to reconnect is tunable via a module parameter. Setting it to 0, means that the client will never attempt to reconnect. The default is 5. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
* cifs: set up recurring workqueue job to do SMB echo requestsJeff Layton2011-01-201-0/+29
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: allow for different handling of received responseJeff Layton2011-01-201-28/+25Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to incorporate async requests, we need to allow for a more general way to do things on receive, rather than just waking up a process. Turn the task pointer in the mid_q_entry into a callback function and a generic data pointer. When a response comes in, or the socket is reconnected, cifsd can call the callback function in order to wake up the process. The default is to just wake up the current process which should mean no change in behavior for existing code. Also, clean up the locking in cifs_reconnect. There doesn't seem to be any need to hold both the srv_mutex and GlobalMid_Lock when walking the list of mids. Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Fix regression during share-level security mounts (Repost)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-01-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | NTLM response length was changed to 16 bytes instead of 24 bytes that are sent in Tree Connection Request during share-level security share mounts. Revert it back to 24 bytes. Reported-and-Tested-by: Grzegorz Ozanski <grzegorz.ozanski@intel.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up accesses to midCountJeff Layton2011-01-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | It's an atomic_t and the code accesses the "counter" field in it directly instead of using atomic_read(). It also is sometimes accessed under a spinlock and sometimes not. Move it out of the spinlock since we don't need belt-and-suspenders for something that's just informational. Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: no need to mark smb_ses_list as cifs_demultiplex_thread is exitingJeff Layton2011-01-191-41/+3Star
| | | | | | | | | | | The TCP_Server_Info is refcounted and every SMB session holds a reference to it. Thus, smb_ses_list is always going to be empty when cifsd is coming down. This is dead code. Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: add cruid= mount optionJeff Layton2011-01-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In commit 3e4b3e1f we separated the "uid" mount option such that it no longer determined the owner of the credential cache by default. When we did this, we added a new option to cifs.upcall (--legacy-uid) to try to make it so that it would behave the same was as it did before. This ignored a rather important point -- the kernel has no way to know what options are being passed to cifs.upcall, so it doesn't know what uid it should use to determine whether to match an existing krb5 session. The simplest solution is to simply add a new "cruid=" mount option that only governs the uid owner of the credential cache for the mount. Unfortunately, this means that the --legacy-uid option in cifs.upcall was ill-considered and is now useless, but I don't see a better way to deal with this. A patch for the mount.cifs manpage will follow once this patch has been accepted. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: move "ntlmssp" and "local_leases" options out of experimental codeJeff Layton2011-01-101-4/+0Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I see no real need to leave these sorts of options under an EXPERIMENTAL ifdef. Since you need a mount option to turn this code on, that only blows out the testing matrix. local_leases has been under the EXPERIMENTAL tag for some time, but it's only the mount option that's under this label. Move it out from under this tag. The NTLMSSP code is also under EXPERIMENTAL, but it needs a mount option to turn it on, and in the future any distro will reasonably want this enabled. Go ahead and move it out from under the EXPERIMENTAL tag. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: replace some hardcoded values with preprocessor constantsJeff Layton2011-01-101-18/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A number of places that deal with RFC1001/1002 negotiations have bare "15" or "16" values. Replace them with RFC_1001_NAME_LEN and RFC_1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL. The patch also cleans up some checkpatch warnings for code surrounding the changes. This should apply cleanly on top of the patch to remove Local_System_Name. Reported-and-Reviwed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Add match_port check during looking for an existing connection (try #4)Pavel Shilovsky2011-01-061-5/+37
| | | | | | | | | | If we have a share mounted by non-standard port and try to mount another share on the same host with standard port, we connect to the first share again - that's wrong. This patch fixes this bug. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Simplify ipv*_connect functions into one (try #4)Pavel Shilovsky2011-01-061-224/+159Star
| | | | | | | | | | Make connect logic more ip-protocol independent and move RFC1001 stuff into a separate function. Also replace union addr in TCP_Server_Info structure with sockaddr_storage. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: allow calling cifs_build_path_to_root on incomplete cifs_sbJeff Layton2010-12-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that cifs_mount will call cifs_build_path_to_root on a newly instantiated cifs_sb. In that case, it's likely that the master_tlink pointer has not yet been instantiated. Fix this by having cifs_build_path_to_root take a cifsTconInfo pointer as well, and have the caller pass that in. Reported-and-Tested-by: Robbert Kouprie <robbert@exx.nl> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix check of error return from is_path_accessableJeff Layton2010-12-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This function will return 0 if everything went ok. Commit 9d002df4 however added a block of code after the following check for rc == -EREMOTE. With that change and when rc == 0, doing the "goto mount_fail_check" here skips that code, leaving the tlink_tree and master_tlink pointer unpopulated. That causes an oops later in cifs_root_iget. Reported-and-Tested-by: Robbert Kouprie <robbert@exx.nl> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: remove Local_System_NameJeff Layton2010-12-061-13/+10Star
| | | | | | | ...this string is zeroed out and nothing ever changes it. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: add attribute cache timeout (actimeo) tunableSuresh Jayaraman2010-12-021-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the attribute cache timeout for CIFS is hardcoded to 1 second. This means that the client might have to issue a QPATHINFO/QFILEINFO call every 1 second to verify if something has changes, which seems too expensive. On the other hand, if the timeout is hardcoded to a higher value, workloads that expect strict cache coherency might see unexpected results. Making attribute cache timeout as a tunable will allow us to make a tradeoff between performance and cache metadata correctness depending on the application/workload needs. Add 'actimeo' tunable that can be used to tune the attribute cache timeout. The default timeout is set to 1 second. Also, display actimeo option value in /proc/mounts. It appears to me that 'actimeo' and the proposed (but not yet merged) 'strictcache' option cannot coexist, so care must be taken that we reset the other option if one of them is set. Changes since last post: - fix option parsing and handle possible values correcly Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: allow fsc mount option only if CONFIG_CIFS_FSCACHE is setSuresh Jayaraman2010-11-301-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, it is possible to specify 'fsc' mount option even if CONFIG_CIFS_FSCACHE has not been set. The option is being ignored silently while the user fscache functionality to work. Fix this by raising error when the CONFIG option is not set. Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: trivial comment fix: tlink_tree is now a rbtreeSuresh Jayaraman2010-11-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Noticed while reviewing (late) the rbtree conversion patchset (which has been merged already). Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: convert tlink_tree to a rbtreeJeff Layton2010-11-021-81/+96
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Radix trees are ideal when you want to track a bunch of pointers and can't embed a tracking structure within the target of those pointers. The tradeoff is an increase in memory, particularly if the tree is sparse. In CIFS, we use the tlink_tree to track tcon_link structs. A tcon_link can never be in more than one tlink_tree, so there's no impediment to using a rb_tree here instead of a radix tree. Convert the new multiuser mount code to use a rb_tree instead. This should reduce the memory required to manage the tlink_tree. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: store pointer to master tlink in superblock (try #2)Jeff Layton2010-11-021-16/+4Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the second version of this patch, the only difference between it and the first one is that this explicitly makes cifs_sb_master_tlink a static inline. Instead of keeping a tag on the master tlink in the tree, just keep a pointer to the master in the superblock. That eliminates the need for using the radix tree to look up a tagged entry. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Cleanup and thus reduce smb session structure and fields used during ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-291-6/+5Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Removed following fields from smb session structure cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech in NTLMSSP. response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response). Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed once authenticaiton process is done. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Use appropriate server challengeShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection (struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over that smb connection. For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection does not count. Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - minor error corrections and cleanupShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-271-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory, let the tiblob get freed. For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function. For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-261-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: cifs_convert_address() returns zero on errorDan Carpenter2010-10-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The cifs_convert_address() returns zero on error but this caller is testing for negative returns. Btw. "i" is unsigned here, so it's never negative. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Allocate session key/client response dynamicallyShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-261-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. sequence_number within server is set to 0x2. The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists of session key followed by client response within structure session_key is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key becomes connetion's session key. ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces function cifs_calculate_session_key(). size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size of the key it holds. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: convert cifs_tcp_ses_lock from a rwlock to a spinlockSuresh Jayaraman2010-10-211-35/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs_tcp_ses_lock is a rwlock with protects the cifs_tcp_ses_list, server->smb_ses_list and the ses->tcon_list. It also protects a few ref counters in server, ses and tcon. In most cases the critical section doesn't seem to be large, in a few cases where it is slightly large, there seem to be really no benefit from concurrent access. I briefly considered RCU mechanism but it appears to me that there is no real need. Replace it with a spinlock and get rid of the last rwlock in the cifs code. Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM authentication and signing - Calculate auth response per smb sessionShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-141-4/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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