| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Add support for events with data type FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE
(e.g. create/attrib/move/delete) for inode and filesystem mark types.
The "inode" events do not carry enough information (i.e. path) to
report event->fd, so we do not allow setting a mask for those events
unless group supports reporting fid.
The "inode" events are not supported on a mount mark, because they do
not carry enough information (i.e. path) to be filtered by mount point.
The "dirent" events (create/move/delete) report the fid of the parent
directory where events took place without specifying the filename of the
child. In the future, fanotify may get support for reporting filename
information for those events.
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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If group requested FAN_REPORT_FID and event has file identifier,
copy that information to user reading the event after event metadata.
fid information is formatted as struct fanotify_event_info_fid
that includes a generic header struct fanotify_event_info_header,
so that other info types could be defined in the future using the
same header.
metadata->event_len includes the length of the fid information.
The fid information includes the filesystem's fsid (see statfs(2))
followed by an NFS file handle of the file that could be passed as
an argument to open_by_handle_at(2).
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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When user requests the flag FAN_REPORT_FID in fanotify_init(),
a unique file identifier of the event target object will be reported
with the event.
The file identifier includes the filesystem's fsid (i.e. from statfs(2))
and an NFS file handle of the file (i.e. from name_to_handle_at(2)).
The file identifier makes holding the path reference and passing a file
descriptor to user redundant, so those are disabled in a group with
FAN_REPORT_FID.
Encode fid and store it in event for a group with FAN_REPORT_FID.
Up to 12 bytes of file handle on 32bit arch (16 bytes on 64bit arch)
are stored inline in fanotify_event struct. Larger file handles are
stored in an external allocated buffer.
On failure to encode fid, we print a warning and queue the event
without the fid information.
[JK: Fold part of later patched into this one to use
exportfs_encode_inode_fh() right away]
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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A new event mask FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM has been defined. This allows users
to receive events and grant access to files that are intending to be
opened for execution. Events of FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM type will be
generated when a file has been opened by using either execve(),
execveat() or uselib() system calls.
This acts in the same manner as previous permission event mask, meaning
that an access response is required from the user application in order
to permit any further operations on the file.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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A new event mask FAN_OPEN_EXEC has been defined so that users have the
ability to receive events specifically when a file has been opened with
the intent to be executed. Events of FAN_OPEN_EXEC type will be
generated when a file has been opened using either execve(), execveat()
or uselib() system calls.
The feature is implemented within fsnotify_open() by generating the
FAN_OPEN_EXEC event type if __FMODE_EXEC is set within file->f_flags.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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In order to identify which thread triggered the event in a
multi-threaded program, add the FAN_REPORT_TID flag in fanotify_init to
opt-in for reporting the event creator's thread id information.
Signed-off-by: nixiaoming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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We do not want to add new bits to the FAN_ALL_* uapi constants
because they have been exposed to userspace. If there are programs
out there using these constants, those programs could break if
re-compiled with modified FAN_ALL_* constants and run on an old kernel.
We deprecate the uapi constants FAN_ALL_* and define new FANOTIFY_*
constants for internal use to replace them. New feature bits will be
added only to the new constants.
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Add another mark type flag FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM for add/remove/flush
of super block mark type.
A super block watch gets all events on the filesystem, regardless of
the mount from which the mark was added, unless an ignore mask exists
on either the inode or the mount where the event was generated.
Only one of FAN_MARK_MOUNT and FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM mark type flags
may be provided to fanotify_mark() or no mark type flag for inode mark.
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull quota, ext2, isofs and udf fixes from Jan Kara:
- two small quota error handling fixes
- two isofs fixes for architectures with signed char
- several udf block number overflow and signedness fixes
- ext2 rework of mount option handling to avoid GFP_KERNEL allocation
with spinlock held
- ... it also contains a patch to implement auditing of responses to
fanotify permission events. That should have been in the fanotify
pull request but I mistakenly merged that patch into a wrong branch
and noticed only now at which point I don't think it's worth rebasing
and redoing.
* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
quota: be aware of error from dquot_initialize
quota: fix potential infinite loop
isofs: use unsigned char types consistently
isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027
udf: Fix some sign-conversion warnings
udf: Fix signed/unsigned format specifiers
udf: Fix 64-bit sign extension issues affecting blocks > 0x7FFFFFFF
udf: Remove some outdate references from documentation
udf: Avoid overflow when session starts at large offset
ext2: Fix possible sleep in atomic during mount option parsing
ext2: Parse mount options into a dedicated structure
audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
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The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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license
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
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