openslx/kernel-qcow2-linux.git - In-kernel qcow2 (Kernel part)

	Commit message (Collapse)	Author	Age	Files	Lines
*	MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel	David Howells	2012-10-10	1	-0/+2
\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|	Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public keys found in the PGP keyring. These can be seen by root: [root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys 07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd [] 15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 ... It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
*	module: signature checking hook	Rusty Russell	2012-10-10	1	-0/+13
	We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module (which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with unsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key. If module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is loaded that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't have the key. (Useful feedback and tweaks by David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>) Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>