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* KEYS: correct alignment of system_certificate_list content in assembly fileHendrik Brueckner2013-12-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Apart from data-type specific alignment constraints, there are also architecture-specific alignment requirements. For example, on s390 symbols must be on even addresses implying a 2-byte alignment. If the system_certificate_list_end symbol is on an odd address and if this address is loaded, the least-significant bit is ignored. As a result, the load_system_certificate_list() fails to load the certificates because of a wrong certificate length calculation. To be safe, align system_certificate_list on an 8-byte boundary. Also improve the length calculation of the system_certificate_list content. Introduce a system_certificate_list_size (8-byte aligned because of unsigned long) variable that stores the length. Let the linker calculate this size by introducing a start and end label for the certificate content. Signed-off-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspaceMimi Zohar2013-09-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read permission on the trusted keys added during boot. The latter is actually more theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently provide a read operation. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flagDavid Howells2013-09-251-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the kernel already possessed. Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signingDavid Howells2013-09-251-0/+103
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>