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* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-12-144-51/+84
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights: Yama: - allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting TPM: - add documentation - many bugfixes & cleanups - define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Integrity: - Harden against malformed xattrs SELinux: - bugfixes & cleanups Smack: - Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label - Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook - parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits) Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister tpm: Fix handling of missing event log tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set tpm: cleanup of printk error messages tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister) tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation ...
| * selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlockAndreas Gruenbacher2016-11-222-40/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set isec->initialized to LABEL_PENDING and release the lock. Then, when the sid has been determined, re-acquire the lock. If isec->initialized is still set to LABEL_PENDING, set isec->sid; otherwise, the sid has been set by another task (LABEL_INITIALIZED) or invalidated (LABEL_INVALID) in the meantime. This fixes a deadlock on gfs2 where * one task is in inode_doinit_with_dentry -> gfs2_getxattr, holds isec->lock, and tries to acquire the inode's glock, and * another task is in do_xmote -> inode_go_inval -> selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx, holds the inode's glock, and tries to acquire isec->lock. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> [PM: minor tweaks to keep checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability definitionsStephen Smalley2016-11-211-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a new capability is defined, SELinux needs to be updated. Trigger a build error if a new capability is defined without corresponding update to security/selinux/include/classmap.h's COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. This is similar to BUILD_BUG_ON() guards in the SELinux nlmsgtab code to ensure that SELinux tracks new netlink message types as needed. Note that there is already a similar build guard in security/selinux/hooks.c to detect when more than 64 capabilities are defined, since that will require adding a third capability class to SELinux. A nicer way to do this would be to extend scripts/selinux/genheaders or a similar tool to auto-generate the necessary definitions and code for SELinux capability checking from include/uapi/linux/capability.h. AppArmor does something similar in its Makefile, although it only needs to generate a single table of names. That is left as future work. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: reformat the description to keep checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: normalize input to /sys/fs/selinux/enforceStephen Smalley2016-11-201-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At present, one can write any signed integer value to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored, e.g. echo -1 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero, but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered to be a security issue, but it should be fixed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: Clean up initialization of isec->sclassAndreas Gruenbacher2016-11-141-6/+4Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED implies that isec->sclass is valid, skip such inodes immediately in inode_doinit_with_dentry. For the remaining inodes, initialize isec->sclass at the beginning of inode_doinit_with_dentry to simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * proc: Pass file mode to proc_pid_make_inodeAndreas Gruenbacher2016-11-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass the file mode of the proc inode to be created to proc_pid_make_inode. In proc_pid_make_inode, initialize inode->i_mode before calling security_task_to_inode. This allows selinux to set isec->sclass right away without introducing "half-initialized" inode security structs. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: Minor cleanupsAndreas Gruenbacher2016-11-142-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the comment for function __inode_security_revalidate, which returns an integer. Use the LABEL_* constants consistently for isec->initialized. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * SELinux: Use GFP_KERNEL for selinux_parse_opts_str().Tetsuo Handa2016-11-141-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since selinux_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is called by selinux_parse_opts_str(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | posix-timers: Make them configurableNicolas Pitre2016-11-161-4/+7
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about 25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out. Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create, timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete, clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm. The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast majority of use cases with very little code. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* mm: Change vm_is_stack_for_task() to vm_is_stack_for_current()Andy Lutomirski2016-10-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Asking for a non-current task's stack can't be done without races unless the task is frozen in kernel mode. As far as I know, vm_is_stack_for_task() never had a safe non-current use case. The __unused annotation is because some KSTK_ESP implementations ignore their parameter, which IMO is further justification for this patch. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c3f68f426e6c061ca98b4fc7ef85ffbb0a25b0c.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-10-111-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro: ">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time() fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode() vfs: Add current_time() api vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename" vfs: remove unused i_op->rename fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2 libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename() fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems ncpfs: fix unused variable warning
| * fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestampsDeepa Dinamani2016-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps. Use current_time() instead. CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe. This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also, current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be y2038 safe. Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they share the same time granularity. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'work.xattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-10-111-12/+7Star
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro: "xattr stuff from Andreas This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr" * 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
| * | xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpersAndreas Gruenbacher2016-10-081-12/+7Star
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR flag instead. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'printk-cleanups'Linus Torvalds2016-10-101-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge my system logging cleanups, triggered by the broken '\n' patches. The line continuation handling has been broken basically forever, and the code to handle the system log records was both confusing and dubious. And it would do entirely the wrong thing unless you always had a terminating newline, partly because it couldn't actually see whether a message was marked KERN_CONT or not (but partly because the LOG_CONT handling in the recording code was rather confusing too). This re-introduces a real semantically meaningful KERN_CONT, and fixes the few places I noticed where it was missing. There are probably more missing cases, since KERN_CONT hasn't actually had any semantic meaning for at least four years (other than the checkpatch meaning of "no log level necessary, this is a continuation line"). This also allows the combination of KERN_CONT and a log level. In that case the log level will be ignored if the merging with a previous line is successful, but if a new record is needed, that new record will now get the right log level. That also means that you can at least in theory combine KERN_CONT with the "pr_info()" style helpers, although any use of pr_fmt() prefixing would make that just result in a mess, of course (the prefix would end up in the middle of a continuing line). * printk-cleanups: printk: make reading the kernel log flush pending lines printk: re-organize log_output() to be more legible printk: split out core logging code into helper function printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines
| * | printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation linesLinus Torvalds2016-10-091-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very much like stdio in user space. It supported log levels by scanning the stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line, but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked. Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different lines got all mixed up with each other. Then you got fragment lines mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a continuation or not. To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines: 474925277671 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation"). That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't actuall make any semantic difference. But it at least made it possible to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk() didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of a previous line. To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases. 5fd29d6ccbc9 ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines") and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all. Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp. You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits e11fea92e13f ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface") 7ff9554bb578 ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer") with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that conversion. Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of it. But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them. And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks. In order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be attached to the previous record properly. However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit 61e99ab8e35a ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT") due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful. The ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole record-level merging of kernel messages going on. This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker, so that the ambiguity is fixed once again. But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in this area. For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a line. Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned it the default loglevel). So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a single one. Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem: rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the KERN_CONT marker. So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs. There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing. That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT. It does result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as a good feature. If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely, because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely. But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky multi-fragment kernel printk's. Not only does it avoid the ambiguity, it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day". (That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of KERN_CONT are very limited. Things get much hairier when you have multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILEVivek Goyal2016-09-191-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u" of common_audit_data. This information is used to print path of file at the same time it is also used to get to dentry and inode. And this inode information is used to get to superblock and device and print device information. This does not work well for layered filesystems like overlay where dentry contained in path is overlay dentry and not the real dentry of underlying file system. That means inode retrieved from dentry is also overlay inode and not the real inode. SELinux helpers like file_path_has_perm() are doing checks on inode retrieved from file_inode(). This returns the real inode and not the overlay inode. That means we are doing check on real inode but for audit purposes we are printing details of overlay inode and that can be confusing while debugging. Hence, introduce a new type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE which carries file information and inode retrieved is real inode using file_inode(). That way right avc denied information is given to user. For example, following is one example avc before the patch. type=AVC msg=audit(1473360868.399:214): avc: denied { read open } for pid=1765 comm="cat" path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile" dev="overlay" ino=21443 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 It looks as follows after the patch. type=AVC msg=audit(1473360017.388:282): avc: denied { read open } for pid=2530 comm="cat" path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile" dev="dm-0" ino=2377915 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of "overlay" device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying inode and not on the overlay inode. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> [PM: slight tweaks to the description to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()Wei Yongjun2016-09-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix to return error code -EINVAL from the error handling case instead of 0 (rc is overwrite to 0 when policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS), as done elsewhere in this function. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> [PM: normalize "selinux" in patch subject, description line wrap] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: fix overflow and 0 length allocationsWilliam Roberts2016-08-302-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Throughout the SELinux LSM, values taken from sepolicy are used in places where length == 0 or length == <saturated> matter, find and fix these. Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: initialize structuresWilliam Roberts2016-08-301-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | libsepol pointed out an issue where its possible to have an unitialized jmp and invalid dereference, fix this. While we're here, zero allocate all the *_val_to_struct structures. Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: detect invalid ebitmapWilliam Roberts2016-08-301-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When count is 0 and the highbit is not zero, the ebitmap is not valid and the internal node is not allocated. This causes issues when routines, like mls_context_isvalid() attempt to use the ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit() as they assume a highbit > 0 will have a node allocated. Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: drop SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAXWilliam Roberts2016-08-192-42/+0Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX Kconfig option Per: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/wiki/Kernel-Todo This was only needed on Fedora 3 and 4 and just causes issues now, so drop it. The MAX and MIN should just be whatever the kernel can support. Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hookVivek Goyal2016-08-101-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid in the passed creds. Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from set of creds passed in. (old->security). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()Vivek Goyal2016-08-091-9/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide where to fetch security pointer from. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hookVivek Goyal2016-08-091-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/ with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hookVivek Goyal2016-08-091-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with appropriate label. Overlay inode has right label for both context and non-context mount cases. In case of non-context mount, overlay inode will have the label of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have the label from context= mount option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | security: Use IS_ENABLED() instead of checking for built-in or moduleJavier Martinez Canillas2016-08-081-6/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding the same. Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-08-061-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull qstr constification updates from Al Viro: "Fairly self-contained bunch - surprising lot of places passes struct qstr * as an argument when const struct qstr * would suffice; it complicates analysis for no good reason. I'd prefer to feed that separately from the assorted fixes (those are in #for-linus and with somewhat trickier topology)" * 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: qstr: constify instances in adfs qstr: constify instances in lustre qstr: constify instances in f2fs qstr: constify instances in ext2 qstr: constify instances in vfat qstr: constify instances in procfs qstr: constify instances in fuse qstr constify instances in fs/dcache.c qstr: constify instances in nfs qstr: constify instances in ocfs2 qstr: constify instances in autofs4 qstr: constify instances in hfs qstr: constify instances in hfsplus qstr: constify instances in logfs qstr: constify dentry_init_security
| * qstr: constify dentry_init_securityAl Viro2016-07-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-07-306-63/+72
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
| * \ Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-07-076-63/+72
| |\ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | into next
| | * calipso: Add a label cache.Huw Davies2016-06-271-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This works in exactly the same way as the CIPSO label cache. The idea is to allow the lsm to cache the result of a secattr lookup so that it doesn't need to perform the lookup for every skbuff. It introduces two sysctl controls: calipso_cache_enable - enables/disables the cache. calipso_cache_bucket_size - sets the size of a cache bucket. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().Huw Davies2016-06-273-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a CALIPSO error handler. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.Huw Davies2016-06-271-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some cases, the lsm needs to add the label to the skbuff directly. A NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT IPv6 hook is added to selinux to match the IPv4 behaviour. This allows selinux to label the skbuffs that it requires. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Request sockets need to have a label that takes into account the incoming connection as well as their parent's label. This is used for the outgoing SYN-ACK and for their child full-socket. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * netlabel: Prevent setsockopt() from changing the hop-by-hop option.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a socket has a netlabel in place then don't let setsockopt() alter the socket's IPv6 hop-by-hop option. This is in the same spirit as the existing check for IPv4. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CALIPSO is a hop-by-hop IPv6 option. A lot of this patch is based on the equivalent CISPO code. The main difference is due to manipulating the options in the hop-by-hop header. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: fix type mismatchHeinrich Schuchardt2016-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int. Do not use a signed new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value). Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> [PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: import NetLabel category bitmaps correctlyPaul Moore2016-06-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing ebitmap_netlbl_import() code didn't correctly handle the case where the ebitmap_node was not aligned/sized to a power of two, this patch fixes this (on x86_64 ebitmap_node contains six bitmaps making a range of 0..383). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: Only apply bounds checking to source typesStephen Smalley2016-05-311-48/+22Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current bounds checking of both source and target types requires allowing any domain that has access to the child domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which is undesirable. Drop the target bounds checking. KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in commit 7d52a155e38d ("selinux: remove dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in commit 2ae3ba39389b ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions to the child that the child is allowed to itself. This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding permissions to the parent of the target. Further, this change reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve a bounds violation. Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the target type. Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic: 1. If we have: typebounds A B; then: allow B self:process <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A self:process <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed: allow A B:process <permissions>; or allow B A:process <permissions>; or allow A self:process <permissions>; However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only need to perform one compute_av call). 2. If we have: typebounds A B; typebounds A_exec B_exec; then: allow B B_exec:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A A_exec:file <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having: allow A B_exec:file <permissions>; in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types. 3. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded type T, then: allow B T:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A T:file <permissions>; is allowed in policy. The old logic would have been identical for this example. 4. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded domain D, then: allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having to allow it to do the same to its parent. The old logic would have required: allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; to also be allowed in policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespacesSeth Forshee2016-06-241-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead. For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the policy writer to specify a different label through policy transition rules. Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | | fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuidAndy Lutomirski2016-06-241-1/+1
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a process gets access to a mount from a different user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid. This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be mounted in non-root user namespaces. This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid, setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem, but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege. As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they are already privileges. On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the caller's security context in a way that should not have been possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined. As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much more difficult to exploit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-05-195-60/+127
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
| * selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacksStephen Smalley2016-04-261-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The execstack check was only being applied on the main process stack. Thread stacks allocated via mmap were only subject to the execmem permission check. Augment the check to apply to the current thread stack as well. Note that this does NOT prevent making a different thread's stack executable. Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checksStephen Smalley2016-04-262-17/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Distinguish capability checks against a target associated with the init user namespace versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the latter. This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace. Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode labelPaul Moore2016-04-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if the security server is not yet initialized. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possiblePaul Moore2016-04-191-8/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting itPaul Moore2016-04-191-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security label when we are in the process of setting it. Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: Change bool variable name to index.Prarit Bhargava2016-04-142-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG(). This patch changes this to index which isn't a type. Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: restrict kernel module loadingJeff Vander Stoep2016-04-052-1/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load. Add module_load permission to the system class. Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load for the target type. Example for finit_module: allow foo bar_file:system module_load; Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load with itself as the target object because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process. Example for init_module: allow foo foo:system module_load; Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> [PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-07-19 11:22:05 +0200