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* Merge branch 'mount.part1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-056-741/+459Star
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro: "Mount API prereqs. Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits, mostly)" * 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits) mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() smack: get rid of match_token() smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt() selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts() selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit selinux: switch away from match_token() selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt() LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts() LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts() LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount() new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() ...
| * smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-85/+23Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make it use smack_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather non-LSM options by memmove() in place Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: get rid of match_token()Al Viro2018-12-211-18/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | same issue as with selinux... [fix by Andrei Vagin folded in] Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helperAl Viro2018-12-211-57/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_add_opt() adds an already matched option to growing smack_mnt_options Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()Al Viro2018-12-213-30/+24Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-92/+54Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make it use selinux_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather non-LSM options by memmove() in place Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bitAl Viro2018-12-211-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: switch away from match_token()Al Viro2018-12-211-27/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's not a good fit, unfortunately, and the next step will make it even less so. Open-code what we need here. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()Al Viro2018-12-211-73/+53Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the guts of the loop in selinux_parse_opts_str() - takes one (already recognized) option and adds it to growing selinux_mnt_opts. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: switch to private smack_mnt_optsAl Viro2018-12-211-102/+55Star
| | | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_optsAl Viro2018-12-211-161/+101Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | none of the convolutions needed, just 4 strings, TYVM... Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic codeAl Viro2018-12-213-32/+85
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-147/+51Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | it's much easier to just do the right thing in ->sb_show_options(), without bothering with allocating and populating arrays, etc. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a methodAl Viro2018-12-213-12/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new method. This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts useAl Viro2018-12-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1) keeping a copy in btrfs_fs_info is completely pointless - we never use it for anything. Getting rid of that allows for simpler calling conventions for setup_security_options() (caller is responsible for freeing mnt_opts in all cases). 2) on remount we want to use ->sb_remount(), not ->sb_set_mnt_opts(), same as we would if not for FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Behaviours *are* close (in fact, selinux sb_set_mnt_opts() ought to punt to sb_remount() in "already initialized" case), but let's handle that uniformly. And the only reason why the original btrfs changes didn't go for security_sb_remount() in btrfs_remount() case is that it hadn't been exported. Let's export it for a while - it'll be going away soon anyway. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-4/+2Star
| | | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro2018-12-213-27/+3Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-3/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(), security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata(). Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_remount()Al Viro2018-12-212-37/+15Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: lift parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro2018-12-213-43/+9Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: make smack_parse_opts_str() clean up on failureAl Viro2018-12-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | fixes e.g. a btrfs leak... Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * selinux: expand superblock_doinit() callsAl Viro2018-12-201-30/+24Star
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabledDavid Howells2018-12-204-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is included. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() functionLinus Torvalds2019-01-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next-tpm' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-021-2/+3
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull TPM updates from James Morris: - Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0. - Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands i.e. struct tpm_buf. * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (25 commits) tpm: add support for partial reads tpm: tpm_ibmvtpm: fix kdoc warnings tpm: fix kdoc for tpm2_flush_context_cmd() tpm: tpm_try_transmit() refactor error flow. tpm: use u32 instead of int for PCR index tpm1: reimplement tpm1_continue_selftest() using tpm_buf tpm1: reimplement SAVESTATE using tpm_buf tpm1: rename tpm1_pcr_read_dev to tpm1_pcr_read() tpm1: implement tpm1_pcr_read_dev() using tpm_buf structure tpm: tpm1: rewrite tpm1_get_random() using tpm_buf structure tpm: tpm-space.c remove unneeded semicolon tpm: tpm-interface.c drop unused macros tpm: add tpm_auto_startup() into tpm-interface.c tpm: factor out tpm_startup function tpm: factor out tpm 1.x pm suspend flow into tpm1-cmd.c tpm: move tpm 1.x selftest code from tpm-interface.c tpm1-cmd.c tpm: factor out tpm1_get_random into tpm1-cmd.c tpm: move tpm_getcap to tpm1-cmd.c tpm: move tpm1_pcr_extend to tpm1-cmd.c tpm: factor out tpm_get_timeouts() ...
| * \ Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20181217' of ↵James Morris2018-12-171-2/+3
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm tpmdd updates for Linux v4.21 From Jarkko: v4.21 updates: * Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0. * Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands i.e. struct tpm_buf.
| | * | tpm: use u32 instead of int for PCR indexTomas Winkler2018-11-131-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TPM specs defines PCR index as a positive number, and there is no reason to use a signed number. It is also a possible security issue as currently no functions check for a negative index, which may become a large number when converted to u32. Adjust the API to use u32 instead of int in all PCR related functions. Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* | | | Merge branch 'next-smack' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-021-3/+9
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull smack updates from James Morris: "Two Smack patches for 4.21. Jose's patch adds missing documentation and Zoran's fleshes out the access checks on keyrings" * 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: Improve Documentation smack: fix access permissions for keyring
| * \ \ \ Merge branch 'smack-for-4.21-a' of https://github.com/cschaufler/next-smack ↵James Morris2018-12-141-3/+9
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next-smack From Casey. "I have two Smack patches for 4.21. One Jose's patch adds missing documentation and Zoran's fleshes out the access checks on keyrings."
| | * | | | smack: fix access permissions for keyringZoran Markovic2018-12-031-3/+9
| | | |/ / | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the following operations: - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ) - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE) A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise. Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW. Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid contents. Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
* | | | | Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-0211-92/+633
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
| * | | | | integrity: Remove references to module keyringThiago Jung Bauermann2018-12-172-4/+2Star
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From what I can tell, it has never been used. Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended signatures for kernel modules. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | | | Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵James Morris2018-12-1711-91/+634
| |\ \ \ \ \ | | |_|_|/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity From Mimi: In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image.  This pull request adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag.  An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here.)
| | * | | | ima: Use inode_is_open_for_writeNikolay Borisov2018-12-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the aptly named function rather than open coding the check. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisalNayna Jain2018-12-131-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the signatures. This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image and initramfs signatures. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)] Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressedJosh Boyer2018-12-131-10/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db variable if it is found. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment] Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure BootJosh Boyer2018-12-132-1/+173
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable. This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well. Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description] Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | efi: Add an EFI signature blob parserDave Howells2018-12-132-1/+110
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of different types. For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or NULL if the type is not of interest. If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler function in turn. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | integrity: Load certs to the platform keyringNayna Jain2018-12-133-24/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | integrity: Define a trusted platform keyringNayna Jain2018-12-135-16/+81
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel image. It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to store platform keys. This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from userspace. This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfsMimi Zohar2018-12-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the builtin IMA policies specified on the boot command line (eg. ima_policy="tcb|appraise_tcb") to permit accessing efivar files. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86Eric Richter2018-12-111-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded via the kexec_load syscall. Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore, this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled. When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes (eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | ima: add support for arch specific policiesNayna Jain2018-12-111-2/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy. There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules persist after loading a custom policy. This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | ima: refactor ima_init_policy()Nayna Jain2018-12-111-41/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining a new function named add_rules(). The new function adds the rules to the initial IMA policy, the custom policy or both based on the policy mask (IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY). Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flagNayna Jain2018-12-111-6/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with secureboot enabled. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure] Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| | * | | | integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding fieldMimi Zohar2018-11-131-0/+1
| | | |/ / | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable), but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system hang. Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify() caller. Fixes: 82f94f24475c ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
* | | | | KEYS: fix parsing invalid pkey info stringEric Biggers2019-01-011-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We need to check the return value of match_token() for Opt_err before doing anything with it. [ Not only did the old "-1" value for Opt_err cause problems for the __test_and_set_bit(), as fixed in commit 94c13f66e13c ("security: don't use a negative Opt_err token index"), but accessing "args[0].from" is invalid for the Opt_err case, as pointed out by Eric later. - Linus ] Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.20 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | | | Merge tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-12-292-10/+10
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kconfig updates from Masahiro Yamada: - support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m - remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly - fix file name and line number in lexer warnings - fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation - resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser - warn no new line at end of file - make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal - rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table - convert to SPDX License Identifier - compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y - fix various warnings of gconfig - misc cleanups * tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (39 commits) kconfig: surround dbg_sym_flags with #ifdef DEBUG to fix gconf warning kconfig: split images.c out of qconf.cc/gconf.c to fix gconf warnings kconfig: add static qualifiers to fix gconf warnings kconfig: split the lexer out of zconf.y kconfig: split some C files out of zconf.y kconfig: convert to SPDX License Identifier kconfig: remove keyword lookup table entirely kconfig: update current_pos in the second lexer kconfig: switch to ASSIGN_VAL state in the second lexer kconfig: stop associating kconf_id with yylval kconfig: refactor end token rules kconfig: stop supporting '.' and '/' in unquoted words treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes microblaze: surround string default in Kconfig with double quotes kconfig: use T_WORD instead of T_VARIABLE for variables kconfig: use specific tokens instead of T_ASSIGN for assignments kconfig: refactor scanning and parsing "option" properties kconfig: use distinct tokens for type and default properties kconfig: remove redundant token defines kconfig: rename depends_list to comment_option_list ...
| * | | | | treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotesMasahiro Yamada2018-12-212-10/+10
| | |_|_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to support bare file paths in the source statement. I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of ambiguity. The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes, and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals. Make it treewide consistent now. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | | | | Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2018-12-291-1/+1
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: - large KASAN update to use arm's "software tag-based mode" - a few misc things - sh updates - ocfs2 updates - just about all of MM * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (167 commits) kernel/fork.c: mark 'stack_vm_area' with __maybe_unused memcg, oom: notify on oom killer invocation from the charge path mm, swap: fix swapoff with KSM pages include/linux/gfp.h: fix typo mm/hmm: fix memremap.h, move dev_page_fault_t callback to hmm hugetlbfs: Use i_mmap_rwsem to fix page fault/truncate race hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization memory_hotplug: add missing newlines to debugging output mm: remove __hugepage_set_anon_rmap() include/linux/vmstat.h: remove unused page state adjustment macro mm/page_alloc.c: allow error injection mm: migrate: drop unused argument of migrate_page_move_mapping() blkdev: avoid migration stalls for blkdev pages mm: migrate: provide buffer_migrate_page_norefs() mm: migrate: move migrate_page_lock_buffers() mm: migrate: lock buffers before migrate_page_move_mapping() mm: migration: factor out code to compute expected number of page references mm, page_alloc: enable pcpu_drain with zone capability kmemleak: add config to select auto scan mm/page_alloc.c: don't call kasan_free_pages() at deferred mem init ...
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