From 0c8d087c04cdcef501064552149289866e53aa6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 10:42:09 +0800 Subject: xen-netback: fix some error return code 'err' is overwrited to 0 after maybe_pull_tail() call, so the error code was not set if skb_partial_csum_set() call failed. Fix to return error -EPROTO from those error handling case instead of 0. Fixes: d52eb0d46f36 ('xen-netback: make sure skb linear area covers checksum field') Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Acked-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 27bbe58dcbe7..7b4fd93be76d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -1209,8 +1209,10 @@ static int checksum_setup_ip(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb, goto out; if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off, - offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) + offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) { + err = -EPROTO; goto out; + } if (recalculate_partial_csum) tcp_hdr(skb)->check = @@ -1227,8 +1229,10 @@ static int checksum_setup_ip(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb, goto out; if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off, - offsetof(struct udphdr, check))) + offsetof(struct udphdr, check))) { + err = -EPROTO; goto out; + } if (recalculate_partial_csum) udp_hdr(skb)->check = @@ -1350,8 +1354,10 @@ static int checksum_setup_ipv6(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb, goto out; if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off, - offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) + offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) { + err = -EPROTO; goto out; + } if (recalculate_partial_csum) tcp_hdr(skb)->check = @@ -1368,8 +1374,10 @@ static int checksum_setup_ipv6(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb, goto out; if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off, - offsetof(struct udphdr, check))) + offsetof(struct udphdr, check))) { + err = -EPROTO; goto out; + } if (recalculate_partial_csum) udp_hdr(skb)->check = -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522 From ac3d5ac277352fe6e27809286768e9f1f8aa388d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Durrant Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2013 09:27:17 +0000 Subject: xen-netback: fix guest-receive-side array sizes The sizes chosen for the metadata and grant_copy_op arrays on the guest receive size are wrong; - The meta array is needlessly twice the ring size, when we only ever consume a single array element per RX ring slot - The grant_copy_op array is way too small. It's sized based on a bogus assumption: that at most two copy ops will be used per ring slot. This may have been true at some point in the past but it's clear from looking at start_new_rx_buffer() that a new ring slot is only consumed if a frag would overflow the current slot (plus some other conditions) so the actual limit is MAX_SKB_FRAGS grant_copy_ops per ring slot. This patch fixes those two sizing issues and, because grant_copy_ops grows so much, it pulls it out into a separate chunk of vmalloc()ed memory. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Acked-by: Wei Liu Cc: Ian Campbell Cc: David Vrabel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 19 +++++++++++++------ drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h index 08ae01b41c83..c47794b9d42f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h @@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ struct xenvif_rx_meta { #define MAX_PENDING_REQS 256 +/* It's possible for an skb to have a maximal number of frags + * but still be less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in size. Thus the + * worst-case number of copy operations is MAX_SKB_FRAGS per + * ring slot. + */ +#define MAX_GRANT_COPY_OPS (MAX_SKB_FRAGS * XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE) + struct xenvif { /* Unique identifier for this interface. */ domid_t domid; @@ -143,13 +150,13 @@ struct xenvif { */ RING_IDX rx_req_cons_peek; - /* Given MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET of 4096 the worst case is that each - * head/fragment page uses 2 copy operations because it - * straddles two buffers in the frontend. - */ - struct gnttab_copy grant_copy_op[2*XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; - struct xenvif_rx_meta meta[2*XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; + /* This array is allocated seperately as it is large */ + struct gnttab_copy *grant_copy_op; + /* We create one meta structure per ring request we consume, so + * the maximum number is the same as the ring size. + */ + struct xenvif_rx_meta meta[XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; u8 fe_dev_addr[6]; diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c index 870f1fa58370..34ca4e58a43d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c @@ -307,6 +307,15 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid, SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, parent); vif = netdev_priv(dev); + + vif->grant_copy_op = vmalloc(sizeof(struct gnttab_copy) * + MAX_GRANT_COPY_OPS); + if (vif->grant_copy_op == NULL) { + pr_warn("Could not allocate grant copy space for %s\n", name); + free_netdev(dev); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + vif->domid = domid; vif->handle = handle; vif->can_sg = 1; @@ -487,6 +496,7 @@ void xenvif_free(struct xenvif *vif) unregister_netdev(vif->dev); + vfree(vif->grant_copy_op); free_netdev(vif->dev); module_put(THIS_MODULE); diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 7b4fd93be76d..78425554a537 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif) if (!npo.copy_prod) return; - BUG_ON(npo.copy_prod > ARRAY_SIZE(vif->grant_copy_op)); + BUG_ON(npo.copy_prod > MAX_GRANT_COPY_OPS); gnttab_batch_copy(vif->grant_copy_op, npo.copy_prod); while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&rxq)) != NULL) { -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522 From f35f76ee76df008131bbe01a2297de0c55ee2297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 10:24:01 -0500 Subject: xen-netback: Include header for vmalloc Commit ac3d5ac27735 ("xen-netback: fix guest-receive-side array sizes") added calls to vmalloc and vfree in the interface.c file without including . This causes build failures if the -Werror=implicit-function-declaration flag is passed. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer Acked-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c index 34ca4e58a43d..fff8cddfed81 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522