From 6eea242f9bcdf828bb56334d8ee5c7cb466e4bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Mladek Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:53:41 +0200 Subject: vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer() This is just a preparation step for further changes. The patch does not change the code. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-2-pmladek@suse.com To: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" Cc: Joe Perches Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek --- lib/vsprintf.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/vsprintf.c') diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 791b6fa36905..eb7b4a06e1f0 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -717,6 +717,55 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); } +int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; + +static noinline_for_stack +char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, + struct printf_spec spec) +{ + switch (kptr_restrict) { + case 0: + /* Always print %pK values */ + break; + case 1: { + const struct cred *cred; + + /* + * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context + * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. + */ + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) { + if (spec.field_width == -1) + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); + return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); + } + + /* + * Only print the real pointer value if the current + * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the + * same credentials it started with. This is because + * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK + * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to + * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using + * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. + */ + cred = current_cred(); + if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || + !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || + !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + case 2: + default: + /* Always print 0's for %pK */ + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + + return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec); +} + static noinline_for_stack char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt) @@ -1476,55 +1525,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, return string(buf, end, uuid, spec); } -int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; - -static noinline_for_stack -char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, - struct printf_spec spec) -{ - switch (kptr_restrict) { - case 0: - /* Always print %pK values */ - break; - case 1: { - const struct cred *cred; - - /* - * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context - * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. - */ - if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) { - if (spec.field_width == -1) - spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); - return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); - } - - /* - * Only print the real pointer value if the current - * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the - * same credentials it started with. This is because - * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK - * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to - * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using - * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. - */ - cred = current_cred(); - if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || - !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || - !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) - ptr = NULL; - break; - } - case 2: - default: - /* Always print 0's for %pK */ - ptr = NULL; - break; - } - - return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec); -} - static noinline_for_stack char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt) -- cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522