From 9548906b2bb7ff09e12c013a55d669bef2c8e121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 05:44:02 +0900
Subject: xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".

Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c956390a9136..a5091ec06aa6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2587,7 +2587,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				       const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				       const struct qstr *qstr,
+				       const char **name,
 				       void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
@@ -2595,7 +2596,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid, clen;
 	int rc;
-	char *namep = NULL, *context;
+	char *context;
 
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -2631,19 +2632,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (name) {
-		namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
-		if (!namep)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		*name = namep;
-	}
+	if (name)
+		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
 
 	if (value && len) {
 		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
-		if (rc) {
-			kfree(namep);
+		if (rc)
 			return rc;
-		}
 		*value = context;
 		*len = clen;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522


From ca4c3fc24e293719fe7410c4e63da9b6bc633b83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: fan.du
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2013 08:33:53 +0800
Subject: net: split rt_genid for ipv4 and ipv6

Current net name space has only one genid for both IPv4 and IPv6, it has below
drawbacks:

- Add/delete an IPv4 address will invalidate all IPv6 routing table entries.
- Insert/remove XFRM policy will also invalidate both IPv4/IPv6 routing table
  entries even when the policy is only applied for one address family.

Thus, this patch attempt to split one genid for two to cater for IPv4 and IPv6
separately in a fine granularity.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/net_namespace.h     | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 include/net/netns/ipv4.h        |  1 +
 include/net/netns/ipv6.h        |  1 +
 net/ipv4/route.c                | 16 ++++++++--------
 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c             |  1 +
 net/ipv6/route.c                |  4 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c          |  8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |  7 ++++++-
 8 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
index 84e37b1ca9e1..1313456a0994 100644
--- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
+++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ struct net {
 	struct netns_ipvs	*ipvs;
 #endif
 	struct sock		*diag_nlsk;
-	atomic_t		rt_genid;
 	atomic_t		fnhe_genid;
 };
 
@@ -333,14 +332,42 @@ static inline void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header)
 }
 #endif
 
-static inline int rt_genid(struct net *net)
+static inline int rt_genid_ipv4(struct net *net)
 {
-	return atomic_read(&net->rt_genid);
+	return atomic_read(&net->ipv4.rt_genid);
 }
 
-static inline void rt_genid_bump(struct net *net)
+static inline void rt_genid_bump_ipv4(struct net *net)
 {
-	atomic_inc(&net->rt_genid);
+	atomic_inc(&net->ipv4.rt_genid);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static inline int rt_genid_ipv6(struct net *net)
+{
+	return atomic_read(&net->ipv6.rt_genid);
+}
+
+static inline void rt_genid_bump_ipv6(struct net *net)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&net->ipv6.rt_genid);
+}
+#else
+static inline int rt_genid_ipv6(struct net *net)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void rt_genid_bump_ipv6(struct net *net)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+/* For callers who don't really care about whether it's IPv4 or IPv6 */
+static inline void rt_genid_bump_all(struct net *net)
+{
+	rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net);
+	rt_genid_bump_ipv6(net);
 }
 
 static inline int fnhe_genid(struct net *net)
diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
index 2ba9de89e8ec..bf2ec2202c56 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
@@ -77,5 +77,6 @@ struct netns_ipv4 {
 	struct fib_rules_ops	*mr_rules_ops;
 #endif
 #endif
+	atomic_t	rt_genid;
 };
 #endif
diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
index 005e2c2e39a9..0fb2401197c5 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct netns_ipv6 {
 #endif
 #endif
 	atomic_t		dev_addr_genid;
+	atomic_t		rt_genid;
 };
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_DEFRAG_IPV6)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index a9a54a236832..e805481eff72 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -435,12 +435,12 @@ static inline int ip_rt_proc_init(void)
 
 static inline bool rt_is_expired(const struct rtable *rth)
 {
-	return rth->rt_genid != rt_genid(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
+	return rth->rt_genid != rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
 }
 
 void rt_cache_flush(struct net *net)
 {
-	rt_genid_bump(net);
+	rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net);
 }
 
 static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst,
@@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ static int ip_route_input_mc(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
 #endif
 	rth->dst.output = ip_rt_bug;
 
-	rth->rt_genid	= rt_genid(dev_net(dev));
+	rth->rt_genid	= rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev));
 	rth->rt_flags	= RTCF_MULTICAST;
 	rth->rt_type	= RTN_MULTICAST;
 	rth->rt_is_input= 1;
@@ -1589,7 +1589,7 @@ static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
+	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
 	rth->rt_flags = flags;
 	rth->rt_type = res->type;
 	rth->rt_is_input = 1;
@@ -1760,7 +1760,7 @@ local_input:
 	rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
 #endif
 
-	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid(net);
+	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(net);
 	rth->rt_flags 	= flags|RTCF_LOCAL;
 	rth->rt_type	= res.type;
 	rth->rt_is_input = 1;
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ add:
 
 	rth->dst.output = ip_output;
 
-	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid(dev_net(dev_out));
+	rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev_out));
 	rth->rt_flags	= flags;
 	rth->rt_type	= type;
 	rth->rt_is_input = 0;
@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_or
 		rt->rt_iif = ort->rt_iif;
 		rt->rt_pmtu = ort->rt_pmtu;
 
-		rt->rt_genid = rt_genid(net);
+		rt->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(net);
 		rt->rt_flags = ort->rt_flags;
 		rt->rt_type = ort->rt_type;
 		rt->rt_gateway = ort->rt_gateway;
@@ -2665,7 +2665,7 @@ static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations sysctl_route_ops = {
 
 static __net_init int rt_genid_init(struct net *net)
 {
-	atomic_set(&net->rt_genid, 0);
+	atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0);
 	atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0);
 	get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid,
 			 sizeof(net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid));
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index a5ac969aeefe..0d1a9b153fbb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -766,6 +766,7 @@ static int __net_init inet6_net_init(struct net *net)
 
 	net->ipv6.sysctl.bindv6only = 0;
 	net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time = 1*HZ;
+	atomic_set(&net->ipv6.rt_genid, 0);
 
 	err = ipv6_init_mibs(net);
 	if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 74ab1f74abcd..ce9616304521 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static inline struct rt6_info *ip6_dst_alloc(struct net *net,
 
 		memset(dst + 1, 0, sizeof(*rt) - sizeof(*dst));
 		rt6_init_peer(rt, table ? &table->tb6_peers : net->ipv6.peers);
-		rt->rt6i_genid = rt_genid(net);
+		rt->rt6i_genid = rt_genid_ipv6(net);
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rt->rt6i_siblings);
 	}
 	return rt;
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
 	 * DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK which forces validation calls down
 	 * into this function always.
 	 */
-	if (rt->rt6i_genid != rt_genid(dev_net(rt->dst.dev)))
+	if (rt->rt6i_genid != rt_genid_ipv6(dev_net(rt->dst.dev)))
 		return NULL;
 
 	if (rt->rt6i_node && (rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum == cookie))
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index e52cab3591dd..d8da6b8c6ba8 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -660,7 +660,13 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
 	xfrm_pol_hold(policy);
 	net->xfrm.policy_count[dir]++;
 	atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
-	rt_genid_bump(net);
+
+	/* After previous checking, family can either be AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+	if (policy->family == AF_INET)
+		rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net);
+	else
+		rt_genid_bump_ipv6(net);
+
 	if (delpol) {
 		xfrm_policy_requeue(delpol, policy);
 		__xfrm_policy_unlink(delpol, dir);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 65f67cb0aefb..6713f04e30ba 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -50,8 +50,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 {
+	struct net *net;
+
 	atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
-	rt_genid_bump(&init_net);
+	rtnl_lock();
+	for_each_net(net)
+		rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+	rtnl_unlock();
 }
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522


From 19e49834d22c2271ed1f4a03aaa4b74986447fb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 12:54:11 -0700
Subject: selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from inode_has_perm

Every single user passes in '0'.  I think we had non-zero users back in
some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms
of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a
totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler
special cases.

See commit 2e33405785d3 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in
selinux_inode_permission") for example.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a5091ec06aa6..967823212d7d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1525,8 +1525,7 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct inode *inode,
 			  u32 perms,
-			  struct common_audit_data *adp,
-			  unsigned flags)
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 sid;
@@ -1539,7 +1538,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	isec = inode->i_security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1554,7 +1553,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1569,7 +1568,7 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = *path;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
 }
 
 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
@@ -1581,7 +1580,7 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad, 0);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1617,7 +1616,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
 	rc = 0;
 	if (av)
-		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
 
 out:
 	return rc;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522


From cb4fbe5703be51f8a2dff4052b1901941ab99e12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 12:57:22 -0700
Subject: selinux: avc_has_perm_flags has no more users

.. so get rid of it.  The only indirect users were all the
avc_has_perm() callers which just expanded to have a zero flags
argument.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         |  9 +++------
 security/selinux/include/avc.h | 14 +++-----------
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index dad36a6ab45f..e720f72fcb87 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -746,7 +746,6 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
  * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
  *
  * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
  * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -756,17 +755,15 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		       u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
-		       unsigned flags)
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc, rc2;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
-			flags);
+	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, 0);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 92d0ab561db8..e30657b59cb3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -147,17 +147,9 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 unsigned flags,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
-		       unsigned);
-
-static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			       struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
-{
-	return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
-}
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522


From ab3540626435c01e08fe58ce544311a78430f112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 14:05:38 -0700
Subject: selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from avc_audit()

Now avc_audit() has no more users with that parameter. Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index e720f72fcb87..fc3e6628a864 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, 0);
+	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 967823212d7d..5b5231068516 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
 	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
-		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
 		if (rc2)
 			return rc2;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index e30657b59cb3..f53ee3c58d0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			    u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			    struct av_decision *avd,
 			    int result,
-			    struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags)
+			    struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
 	u32 audited, denied;
 	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		return 0;
 	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
 			      requested, audited, denied,
-			      a, flags);
+			      a, 0);
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-55-g7522