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author | Stanislav Brabec | 2016-03-02 20:35:54 +0100 |
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committer | Karel Zak | 2016-09-29 14:24:00 +0200 |
commit | a0a8e9884443601abf9f06b715f2f6bb0820cbad (patch) | |
tree | 8e518a607b1613a372df472daecbe911195c6d35 /misc-utils/kill.c | |
parent | libmount: paranoid change in mnt_table_is_fs_mounted() (diff) | |
download | kernel-qcow2-util-linux-a0a8e9884443601abf9f06b715f2f6bb0820cbad.tar.gz kernel-qcow2-util-linux-a0a8e9884443601abf9f06b715f2f6bb0820cbad.tar.xz kernel-qcow2-util-linux-a0a8e9884443601abf9f06b715f2f6bb0820cbad.zip |
tests: Add helper for TIOCSTI exploit
This helper/exploit injects "id -u -n\n" to the vulnerable calling terminal.
Use id -u -n to get a reproducible output of test cases based on it.
What can happen:
Nothing, no exploit: pty is not accessible, sedsid() disconnected the task from
pty, TIOCSTI failed.
The command is injected to the unprivileged environment pty, and you see e. g.
"nobody": This is acceptable.
The command is injected to the caller (privileged) pty, and you see "root" (or
caller uid name): This is not acceptable and has security implications.
References:
CVE-2016-2779
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-2779
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/448
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=815922
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=173008
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=968674
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=968675
CVE-2016-2781
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-2781
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/452
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Brabec <sbrabec@suse.cz>
Cc: Federico Bento <up201407890@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt>
Diffstat (limited to 'misc-utils/kill.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions