| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
For example 'cal August' to print August for the current year.
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Addresses: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/b86db3c7cff489b8ce4cf9fc58176a78a1797bdc#commitcomment-19326504
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Option is documented and used as --nooverlap, bud coded as --nooverlaps.
--nooverlap is considered as shortened option, making the typo
invisible.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Brabec <sbrabec@suse.cz>
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Check if the length of the parsed string is at least 1,
otherwise an out of boundary read would occur.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
free() is not a safe function for a signal handler. The next
line calls _exit() anyway, so there is no need for resource
management.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A strlen() call can lead to out of boundary read access if the
superblock in question has no nul-bytes after the string. This
could be avoided by using strnlen() but the calls in question
merely existed to check if the string length is not 0.
By changing the calls as proposed with this diff, these files are
in sync with other superblock files, which do exactly the same.
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|\ |
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Before fix "fsck -y /d<tab>" will never show LVM VG from multipath or mapped devices
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|/
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit 8e4925016875c6a4f2ab4f833ba66f0fc57396a2.
Stupid hack...
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* do not reset 'nice' setting by sched_setattr(), if 'nice' setting
is not zero then chrt ends with EPERM for non-root users:
$ renice -n 5 -p $$; chrt -v -b 0 date
12475 (process ID) old priority 0, new priority 5
chrt: failed to set pid 0's policy: Operation not permitted
* it seems more elegant to always use old sched_setscheduler() API for
non-deadline policies; in this case we do not need getpriority()
to keep 'nice' unchanged.
Addresses: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/359
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patch add libseccomp based syscalls filter to disable TIOCSTI
ioctl in su/runuser children.
IMHO it is not elegant solution due to dependence on libseccomp
(--without-seccomp if hate it)... but there is nothing better for now.
Addresses: CVE-2016-2779
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This helper/exploit injects "id -u -n\n" to the vulnerable calling terminal.
Use id -u -n to get a reproducible output of test cases based on it.
What can happen:
Nothing, no exploit: pty is not accessible, sedsid() disconnected the task from
pty, TIOCSTI failed.
The command is injected to the unprivileged environment pty, and you see e. g.
"nobody": This is acceptable.
The command is injected to the caller (privileged) pty, and you see "root" (or
caller uid name): This is not acceptable and has security implications.
References:
CVE-2016-2779
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-2779
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/448
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=815922
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=173008
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=968674
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=968675
CVE-2016-2781
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-2781
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/452
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Brabec <sbrabec@suse.cz>
Cc: Federico Bento <up201407890@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt>
|
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
|