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authorDaniel P. Berrangé2022-05-10 15:17:43 +0200
committerDaniel P. Berrangé2022-10-27 13:55:27 +0200
commitc1d8634c207defb547a57515729233e47f65718f (patch)
treea4f556b2db9b25aa876687d2d4aaab5fbc72cff2 /crypto
parenttests: avoid DOS line endings in PSK file (diff)
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crypto: sanity check that LUKS header strings are NUL-terminated
The LUKS spec requires that header strings are NUL-terminated, and our code relies on that. Protect against maliciously crafted headers by adding validation. Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/block-luks.c18
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/block-luks.c b/crypto/block-luks.c
index f62be6836b..27d1b34c1d 100644
--- a/crypto/block-luks.c
+++ b/crypto/block-luks.c
@@ -554,6 +554,24 @@ qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(const QCryptoBlockLUKS *luks, Error **errp)
return -1;
}
+ if (!memchr(luks->header.cipher_name, '\0',
+ sizeof(luks->header.cipher_name))) {
+ error_setg(errp, "LUKS header cipher name is not NUL terminated");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!memchr(luks->header.cipher_mode, '\0',
+ sizeof(luks->header.cipher_mode))) {
+ error_setg(errp, "LUKS header cipher mode is not NUL terminated");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!memchr(luks->header.hash_spec, '\0',
+ sizeof(luks->header.hash_spec))) {
+ error_setg(errp, "LUKS header hash spec is not NUL terminated");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Check all keyslots for corruption */
for (i = 0 ; i < QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_NUM_KEY_SLOTS ; i++) {