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author | Greg Kurz | 2017-02-26 23:44:28 +0100 |
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committer | Greg Kurz | 2017-02-28 11:21:15 +0100 |
commit | e3187a45dd02a7490f9191c16527dc28a4ba45b9 (patch) | |
tree | fcbee78aa41eeb8071c78dfdede06b7c50ddbf2f /hw/intc/mips_gic.c | |
parent | 9pfs: local: link: don't follow symlinks (diff) | |
download | qemu-e3187a45dd02a7490f9191c16527dc28a4ba45b9.tar.gz qemu-e3187a45dd02a7490f9191c16527dc28a4ba45b9.tar.xz qemu-e3187a45dd02a7490f9191c16527dc28a4ba45b9.zip |
9pfs: local: chmod: don't follow symlinks
The local_chmod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) chmod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
We would need fchmodat() to implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW to fix (1). This
isn't the case on linux unfortunately: the kernel doesn't even have a flags
argument to the syscall :-\ It is impossible to fix it in userspace in
a race-free manner. This patch hence converts local_chmod() to rely on
open_nofollow() and fchmod(). This fixes the vulnerability but introduces
a limitation: the target file must readable and/or writable for the call
to openat() to succeed.
It introduces a local_set_xattrat() replacement to local_set_xattr()
based on fsetxattrat() to fix (2), and a local_set_mapped_file_attrat()
replacement to local_set_mapped_file_attr() based on local_fopenat()
and mkdirat() to fix (3). No effort is made to factor out code because
both local_set_xattr() and local_set_mapped_file_attr() will be dropped
when all users have been converted to use the "at" versions.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/intc/mips_gic.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions