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author | Vivek Goyal | 2022-01-25 19:51:14 +0100 |
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committer | Dr. David Alan Gilbert | 2022-01-26 11:32:05 +0100 |
commit | 449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca (patch) | |
tree | 587e621fd8db7cb3c6f4b76b3ba4d3a95aeab3fa /scripts/qapi/schema.py | |
parent | Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/jsnow-gitlab/tags/python-pull-request' ... (diff) | |
download | qemu-449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca.tar.gz qemu-449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca.tar.xz qemu-449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca.zip |
virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups (CVE-2022-0358)
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is
not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch
uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing
supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not
normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir
This sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into
this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test
$ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it,
get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is
privilege escalation.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044863
Fixes: CVE-2022-0358
Reported-by: JIETAO XIAO <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YfBGoriS38eBQrAb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Fixed missing {}'s style nit
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/qapi/schema.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions