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authorMichael Brown2017-07-28 22:19:45 +0200
committerMichael Brown2017-07-28 22:30:43 +0200
commit936657832f2262ad04bdf16b9229ce0b1d1c174f (patch)
treebc5ff1a50c989c604e462d4443822b163b2577a8 /src/arch
parent[acpi] Fix spurious uninitialised-variable warning on some gcc versions (diff)
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[hyperv] Do not steal ownership from the Gen 2 UEFI firmware
We must not steal ownership from the Gen 2 UEFI firmware, since doing so will cause an immediate system crash (most likely in the form of a reboot). This problem was masked before commit a0f6e75 ("[hyperv] Do not fail if guest OS ID MSR is already set"), since prior to that commit we would always fail if we found any non-zero guest OS identity. We now accept a non-zero previous guest OS identity in order to allow for situations such as chainloading from iPXE to another iPXE, and as a prerequisite for commit b91cc98 ("[hyperv] Cope with Windows Server 2016 enlightenments"). A proper fix would be to reverse engineer the UEFI protocols exposed within the Hyper-V Gen 2 firmware and use these to bind to the VMBus device representing the network connection, (with the native Hyper-V driver moved to become a BIOS-only feature). As an interim solution, fail to initialise the native Hyper-V driver if we detect the guest OS identity known to be used by the Gen 2 UEFI firmware. This will cause the standard all-drivers build (ipxe.efi) to fall back to using the SNP driver. Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/arch')
-rw-r--r--src/arch/x86/drivers/hyperv/hyperv.c28
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/arch/x86/drivers/hyperv/hyperv.c b/src/arch/x86/drivers/hyperv/hyperv.c
index 4e687687..1903d1db 100644
--- a/src/arch/x86/drivers/hyperv/hyperv.c
+++ b/src/arch/x86/drivers/hyperv/hyperv.c
@@ -221,6 +221,29 @@ static int hv_check_features ( struct hv_hypervisor *hv ) {
}
/**
+ * Check that Gen 2 UEFI firmware is not running
+ *
+ * @v hv Hyper-V hypervisor
+ * @ret rc Return status code
+ *
+ * We must not steal ownership from the Gen 2 UEFI firmware, since
+ * doing so will cause an immediate crash. Avoid this by checking for
+ * the guest OS identity known to be used by the Gen 2 UEFI firmware.
+ */
+static int hv_check_uefi ( struct hv_hypervisor *hv ) {
+ uint64_t guest_os_id;
+
+ /* Check for UEFI firmware's guest OS identity */
+ guest_os_id = rdmsr ( HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID );
+ if ( guest_os_id == HV_GUEST_OS_ID_UEFI ) {
+ DBGC ( hv, "HV %p is owned by UEFI firmware\n", hv );
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
* Map hypercall page
*
* @v hv Hyper-V hypervisor
@@ -556,6 +579,10 @@ static int hv_probe ( struct root_device *rootdev ) {
if ( ( rc = hv_check_features ( hv ) ) != 0 )
goto err_check_features;
+ /* Check that Gen 2 UEFI firmware is not running */
+ if ( ( rc = hv_check_uefi ( hv ) ) != 0 )
+ goto err_check_uefi;
+
/* Allocate pages */
if ( ( rc = hv_alloc_pages ( hv, &hv->hypercall, &hv->synic.message,
&hv->synic.event, NULL ) ) != 0 )
@@ -587,6 +614,7 @@ static int hv_probe ( struct root_device *rootdev ) {
hv_free_pages ( hv, hv->hypercall, hv->synic.message, hv->synic.event,
NULL );
err_alloc_pages:
+ err_check_uefi:
err_check_features:
free ( hv );
err_alloc: