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-rw-r--r--src/interface/efi/efi_rng.c46
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/src/interface/efi/efi_rng.c b/src/interface/efi/efi_rng.c
index b76a6fc0d..66b37fe89 100644
--- a/src/interface/efi/efi_rng.c
+++ b/src/interface/efi/efi_rng.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
*/
FILE_LICENCE ( GPL2_OR_LATER_OR_UBDL );
+FILE_SECBOOT ( PERMITTED );
#include <errno.h>
#include <ipxe/entropy.h>
@@ -54,6 +55,15 @@ EFI_REQUEST_PROTOCOL ( EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL, &efirng );
*/
#define EFIRNG_LEN 32
+/** Maximum number of times to attempting requesting data from RNG
+ *
+ * The UEFI spec allows GetRNG() to return EFI_NOT_READY, which is not
+ * a particularly helpful error status since there is nothing that can
+ * sensibly be done except to retry immediately. We retry failed
+ * calls to GetRNG() (for any reason) up to this number of times.
+ */
+#define EFIRNG_MAX_RETRY 16
+
/**
* Enable entropy gathering
*
@@ -85,29 +95,35 @@ static int efirng_enable ( void ) {
*/
static int efirng_get_noise ( noise_sample_t *noise ) {
uint8_t buf[EFIRNG_LEN];
+ unsigned int i;
EFI_STATUS efirc;
int rc;
/* Sanity check */
assert ( efirng != NULL );
- /* Get the minimum allowed number of random bytes */
- if ( ( efirc = efirng->GetRNG ( efirng, NULL, sizeof ( buf ),
- buf ) ) != 0 ) {
- rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
- DBGC ( &efirng, "ENTROPY could not read from RNG: %s\n",
- strerror ( rc ) );
- return rc;
+ /* Get random bytes, retrying if needed */
+ for ( i = 0 ; i < EFIRNG_MAX_RETRY ; i++ ) {
+
+ /* Get the minimum allowed number of random bytes */
+ if ( ( efirc = efirng->GetRNG ( efirng, NULL, sizeof ( buf ),
+ buf ) ) != 0 ) {
+ rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Reduce random bytes to a single noise sample. This
+ * seems like overkill, but we have no way of knowing
+ * how much entropy is actually present in the bytes
+ * returned by the RNG protocol.
+ */
+ *noise = crc32_le ( 0, buf, sizeof ( buf ) );
+ return 0;
}
- /* Reduce random bytes to a single noise sample. This seems
- * like overkill, but we have no way of knowing how much
- * entropy is actually present in the bytes returned by the
- * RNG protocol.
- */
- *noise = crc32_le ( 0, buf, sizeof ( buf ) );
-
- return 0;
+ DBGC ( &efirng, "ENTROPY could not read from RNG: %s\n",
+ strerror ( rc ) );
+ return rc;
}
/** EFI random number generator protocol entropy source */