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One of the design goals of ASN.1 DER is to provide a canonical
serialization of a data structure, thereby allowing for equality of
values to be tested by simply comparing the serialized bytes.
Some OCSP servers will modify the request certID to omit the optional
(and null) "parameters" portion of the hashAlgorithm. This is
arguably legal but breaks the ability to perform a straightforward
bitwise comparison on the entire certID field between request and
response.
Fix by comparing the OID-identified hashAlgorithm separately from the
remaining certID fields.
Originally-fixed-by: Thilo Fromm <Thilo@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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The OCSP responder URI included within an X.509 certificate may or may
not include a trailing slash. We currently rely on the fact that
format_uri() incorrectly inserts an initial slash, which we include
unconditionally within the OCSP request URI.
Switch to using uri_encode() directly, and insert a slash only if the
X.509 certificate's OCSP responder URI does not already include a
trailing slash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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We currently compare the entirety of the KeyHash object (including the
ASN.1 tag and length byte) against the raw SHA-1 hash of the
certificate's public key. This causes OCSP validation to fail for any
responses which identify the responder by key hash rather than by
name, and hence prevents the use of X.509 certificates where any
certificate in the chain has an OCSP responder which chooses to
identify itself via its key hash.
Fix by adding the missing asn1_enter() required to enter the ASN.1
octet string containing the key hash.
Also add a corresponding test case including an OCSP response where
the responder is identified by key hash, to ensure that this
functionality cannot be broken in future.
Debugged-by: Brian Rak <brak@gameservers.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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iPXE currently allocates a copy the certificate's common name as a
string. This string is used by the TLS and CMS code to check
certificate names against an expected name, and also appears in
debugging messages.
Provide a function x509_check_name() to centralise certificate name
checking (in preparation for adding subjectAlternativeName support),
and a function x509_name() to provide a name to be used in debugging
messages, and remove the dynamically allocated string.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Certificate authorities are not required to send the certificate used
to sign the OCSP response if the response is signed by the original
issuer.
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add support for parsing of URIs containing literal IPv6 addresses
(e.g. "http://[fe80::69ff:fe50:5845%25net0]/boot.ipxe").
Duplicate URIs by directly copying the relevant fields, rather than by
formatting and reparsing a URI string. This relaxes the requirements
on the URI formatting code and allows it to focus on generating
human-readable URIs (e.g. by not escaping ':' characters within
literal IPv6 addresses). As a side-effect, this allows relative URIs
containing parameter lists (e.g. "../boot.php##params") to function
as expected.
Add validity check for FTP paths to ensure that only printable
characters are accepted (since FTP is a human-readable line-based
protocol with no support for character escaping).
Construct TFTP next-server+filename URIs directly, rather than parsing
a constructed "tftp://..." string,
Add self-tests for URI functions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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RFC2560 mandates that a valid OCSP response will contain exactly one
relevant certificate. However, some OCSP responders include
extraneous certificates. iPXE currently assumes that the first
certificate in the OCSP response is the relevant certificate; OCSP
checks will therefore fail if the responder includes the extraneous
certificates before the relevant certificate.
Fix by using the responder ID to identify the relevant certificate.
Reported-by: Christian Stroehmeier <stroemi@mail.uni-paderborn.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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iPXE has no concept of the local time zone, mainly because there is no
viable way to obtain time zone information in the absence of local
state. This causes potential problems with newly-issued certificates
and certificates that are about to expire.
Avoid such problems by allowing an error margin of around 12 hours on
certificate validity periods, similar to the error margin already
allowed for OCSP response timestamps.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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Add support for constructing OCSP queries and parsing OCSP responses.
(There is no support yet for actually issuing an OCSP query via an
HTTP POST.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
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