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-rw-r--r--driver/passwd-pwent.c312
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diff --git a/driver/passwd-pwent.c b/driver/passwd-pwent.c
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+/* passwd-pwent.c --- verifying typed passwords with the OS.
+ * xscreensaver, Copyright (c) 1993-1998 Jamie Zawinski <jwz@jwz.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its
+ * documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that
+ * the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
+ * documentation. No representations are made about the suitability of this
+ * software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or
+ * implied warranty.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NO_LOCKING /* whole file */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifndef VMS
+# include <pwd.h>
+# include <grp.h>
+#else /* VMS */
+# include "vms-pwd.h"
+#endif /* VMS */
+
+
+#ifdef __bsdi__
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# if _BSDI_VERSION >= 199608
+# define BSD_AUTH
+# endif
+#endif /* __bsdi__ */
+
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_PASSWD) /* passwds live in /etc/shadow */
+
+# include <shadow.h>
+# define PWTYPE struct spwd *
+# define PWPSLOT sp_pwdp
+# define GETPW getspnam
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_ENHANCED_PASSWD) /* passwds live in /tcb/files/auth/ */
+ /* M.Matsumoto <matsu@yao.sharp.co.jp> */
+# include <sys/security.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+
+# define PWTYPE struct pr_passwd *
+# define PWPSLOT ufld.fd_encrypt
+# define GETPW getprpwnam
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_ADJUNCT_PASSWD)
+
+# include <sys/label.h>
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# include <pwdadj.h>
+
+# define PWTYPE struct passwd_adjunct *
+# define PWPSLOT pwa_passwd
+# define GETPW getpwanam
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_HPUX_PASSWD)
+
+# include <hpsecurity.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+
+# define PWTYPE struct s_passwd *
+# define PWPSLOT pw_passwd
+# define GETPW getspwnam
+
+# define HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+
+#endif
+
+
+/* blargh */
+#undef Bool
+#undef True
+#undef False
+#define Bool int
+#define True 1
+#define False 0
+
+
+extern const char *blurb(void);
+
+static char *encrypted_root_passwd = 0;
+static char *encrypted_user_passwd = 0;
+
+#ifdef VMS
+# define ROOT "SYSTEM"
+#else
+# define ROOT "root"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef VMS
+Bool pwent_priv_init (int argc, char **argv, Bool verbose_p);
+Bool pwent_lock_init (int argc, char **argv, Bool verbose_p);
+Bool pwent_passwd_valid_p (const char *typed_passwd, Bool verbose_p);
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef VMS
+
+static char *
+user_name (void)
+{
+ /* I think that just checking $USER here is not the best idea. */
+
+ const char *u = 0;
+
+ /* It has been reported that getlogin() returns the wrong user id on some
+ very old SGI systems... And I've seen it return the string "rlogin"
+ sometimes! Screw it, using getpwuid() should be enough...
+ */
+/* u = (char *) getlogin ();
+ */
+
+ /* getlogin() fails if not attached to a terminal; in that case, use
+ getpwuid(). (Note that in this case, we're not doing shadow stuff, since
+ all we're interested in is the name, not the password. So that should
+ still work. Right?) */
+ if (!u || !*u)
+ {
+ struct passwd *p = getpwuid (getuid ());
+ u = (p ? p->pw_name : 0);
+ }
+
+ return (u ? strdup(u) : 0);
+}
+
+#else /* VMS */
+
+static char *
+user_name (void)
+{
+ char *u = getenv("USER");
+ return (u ? strdup(u) : 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* VMS */
+
+
+static Bool
+passwd_known_p (const char *pw)
+{
+ return (pw &&
+ pw[0] != '*' && /* This would be sensible... */
+ strlen(pw) > 4); /* ...but this is what Solaris does. */
+}
+
+
+static char *
+get_encrypted_passwd(const char *user)
+{
+ char *result = 0;
+
+#ifdef PWTYPE
+ if (user && *user && !result)
+ { /* First check the shadow passwords. */
+ PWTYPE p = GETPW((char *) user);
+ if (p && passwd_known_p (p->PWPSLOT))
+ result = strdup(p->PWPSLOT);
+ }
+#endif /* PWTYPE */
+
+ if (user && *user && !result)
+ { /* Check non-shadow passwords too. */
+ struct passwd *p = getpwnam(user);
+ if (p && passwd_known_p (p->pw_passwd))
+ result = strdup(p->pw_passwd);
+ }
+
+ /* The manual for passwd(4) on HPUX 10.10 says:
+
+ Password aging is put in effect for a particular user if his
+ encrypted password in the password file is followed by a comma and
+ a nonnull string of characters from the above alphabet. This
+ string defines the "age" needed to implement password aging.
+
+ So this means that passwd->pw_passwd isn't simply a string of cyphertext,
+ it might have trailing junk. So, if there is a comma in the string, and
+ that comma is beyond position 13, terminate the string before the comma.
+ */
+ if (result && strlen(result) > 13)
+ {
+ char *s = strchr (result+13, ',');
+ if (s)
+ *s = 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM
+ /* We only issue this warning if not compiled with support for PAM.
+ If we're using PAM, it's not unheard of that normal pwent passwords
+ would be unavailable. */
+
+ if (!result)
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s: couldn't get password of \"%s\"\n",
+ blurb(), (user ? user : "(null)"));
+#endif /* !HAVE_PAM */
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+
+/* This has to be called before we've changed our effective user ID,
+ because it might need privileges to get at the encrypted passwords.
+ Returns false if we weren't able to get any passwords, and therefore,
+ locking isn't possible. (It will also have written to stderr.)
+ */
+
+#ifndef VMS
+
+Bool
+pwent_priv_init (int argc, char **argv, Bool verbose_p)
+{
+ char *u;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ENHANCED_PASSWD
+ set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
+ check_auth_parameters();
+#endif /* HAVE_DEC_ENHANCED */
+
+ u = user_name();
+ encrypted_user_passwd = get_encrypted_passwd(u);
+ encrypted_root_passwd = get_encrypted_passwd(ROOT);
+ if (u) free (u);
+
+ if (encrypted_user_passwd)
+ return True;
+ else
+ return False;
+}
+
+
+Bool
+pwent_lock_init (int argc, char **argv, Bool verbose_p)
+{
+ if (encrypted_user_passwd)
+ return True;
+ else
+ return False;
+}
+
+
+
+static Bool
+passwds_match_p (const char *cleartext, const char *ciphertext)
+{
+ char *s = 0; /* note that on some systems, crypt() may return null */
+
+ s = (char *) crypt (cleartext, ciphertext);
+ if (s && !strcmp (s, ciphertext))
+ return True;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+ /* There seems to be no way to tell at runtime if an HP machine is in
+ "trusted" mode, and thereby, which of crypt() or bigcrypt() we should
+ be calling to compare passwords. So call them both, and see which
+ one works. */
+
+ s = (char *) bigcrypt (cleartext, ciphertext);
+ if (s && !strcmp (s, ciphertext))
+ return True;
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT */
+
+ return False;
+}
+
+
+
+/* This can be called at any time, and says whether the typed password
+ belongs to either the logged in user (real uid, not effective); or
+ to root.
+ */
+Bool
+pwent_passwd_valid_p (const char *typed_passwd, Bool verbose_p)
+{
+ if (encrypted_user_passwd &&
+ passwds_match_p (typed_passwd, encrypted_user_passwd))
+ return True;
+
+#ifdef ALLOW_ROOT_PASSWD
+ /* do not allow root to have a null password. */
+ else if (typed_passwd[0] &&
+ encrypted_root_passwd &&
+ passwds_match_p (typed_passwd, encrypted_root_passwd))
+ return True;
+#endif /* ALLOW_ROOT_PASSWD */
+
+ else
+ return False;
+}
+
+#else /* VMS */
+Bool pwent_lock_init (int argc, char **argv, Bool verbose_p) { return True; }
+#endif /* VMS */
+
+#endif /* NO_LOCKING -- whole file */
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