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authorMiklos Szeredi2016-07-29 12:05:23 +0200
committerMiklos Szeredi2016-07-29 12:05:23 +0200
commit9c630ebefeeee4363ffd29f2f9b18eddafc6479c (patch)
tree377086556cf88b99ffba8b935c6a72d1f365ba9c /fs/overlayfs/inode.c
parentovl: do not require mounter to have MAY_WRITE on lower (diff)
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ovl: simplify permission checking
The fact that we always do permission checking on the overlay inode and clear MAY_WRITE for checking access to the lower inode allows cruft to be removed from ovl_permission(). 1) "default_permissions" option effectively did generic_permission() on the overlay inode with i_mode, i_uid and i_gid updated from underlying filesystem. This is what we do by default now. It did the update using vfs_getattr() but that's only needed if the underlying filesystem can change (which is not allowed). We may later introduce a "paranoia_mode" that verifies that mode/uid/gid are not changed. 2) splitting out the IS_RDONLY() check from inode_permission() also becomes unnecessary once we remove the MAY_WRITE from the lower inode check. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs/inode.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/inode.c46
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 8f7dd547cfb3..66f42f5cf705 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -124,29 +124,6 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
const struct cred *old_cred;
int err;
- if (ovl_is_default_permissions(inode)) {
- struct kstat stat;
- struct path realpath = { .dentry = realdentry };
-
- if (mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
- return -ECHILD;
-
- realpath.mnt = ovl_entry_mnt_real(oe, inode, is_upper);
-
- err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, &stat);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- if ((stat.mode ^ inode->i_mode) & S_IFMT)
- return -ESTALE;
-
- inode->i_mode = stat.mode;
- inode->i_uid = stat.uid;
- inode->i_gid = stat.gid;
-
- return generic_permission(inode, mask);
- }
-
/* Careful in RCU walk mode */
realinode = d_inode_rcu(realdentry);
if (!realinode) {
@@ -154,27 +131,6 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return -ENOENT;
}
- if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
- umode_t mode = realinode->i_mode;
-
- /*
- * Writes will always be redirected to upper layer, so
- * ignore lower layer being read-only.
- *
- * If the overlay itself is read-only then proceed
- * with the permission check, don't return EROFS.
- * This will only happen if this is the lower layer of
- * another overlayfs.
- *
- * If upper fs becomes read-only after the overlay was
- * constructed return EROFS to prevent modification of
- * upper layer.
- */
- if (is_upper && !IS_RDONLY(inode) && IS_RDONLY(realinode) &&
- (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)))
- return -EROFS;
- }
-
/*
* Check overlay inode with the creds of task and underlying inode
* with creds of mounter
@@ -186,7 +142,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
if (!is_upper)
mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
- err = __inode_permission(realinode, mask);
+ err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return err;