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| author | Kees Cook | 2019-04-20 05:27:05 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theodore Ts'o | 2019-04-20 05:27:05 +0200 |
| commit | d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3 (patch) | |
| tree | 43265cdcfde71ed2fdbd562c17f034c28aab15bc /include/acpi/actypes.h | |
| parent | random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits (diff) | |
| download | kernel-qcow2-linux-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.tar.gz kernel-qcow2-linux-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.tar.xz kernel-qcow2-linux-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.zip | |
random: move rand_initialize() earlier
Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
canary initialization here as well.
Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/acpi/actypes.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions