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authorEric Dumazet2009-08-07 00:09:28 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds2009-08-07 19:39:56 +0200
commit9c8a8228d0827e0d91d28527209988f672f97d28 (patch)
tree795b72cfb89abe8bfae1c51dd329e0d6c2ed754f /kernel/fork.c
parentdrivers/mmc: correct error-handling code (diff)
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execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem. clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features. One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value. One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies. The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time. kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid. At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one. As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes. Following sequence could happen: 1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall 2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid) 3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value) 4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() : if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } 5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file) If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects. Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program. Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/fork.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c22
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 466531eb92cc..021e1138556e 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary
* trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit.
*/
- if (tsk->clear_child_tid
- && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
- && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
- u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
+ if (tsk->clear_child_tid) {
+ if (!(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) &&
+ atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
+ /*
+ * We don't check the error code - if userspace has
+ * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
+ */
+ put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid);
+ sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE,
+ 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ }
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
-
- /*
- * We don't check the error code - if userspace has
- * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
- */
- put_user(0, tidptr);
- sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
}