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| author | Ilya Dryomov | 2016-12-02 16:35:09 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ilya Dryomov | 2016-12-12 23:09:21 +0100 |
| commit | 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 (patch) | |
| tree | c1ae131badc84a83b8df5746b5ce93bebfc2da39 /net/ceph/auth_none.c | |
| parent | libceph: no need for GFP_NOFS in ceph_monc_init() (diff) | |
| download | kernel-qcow2-linux-5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0.tar.gz kernel-qcow2-linux-5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0.tar.xz kernel-qcow2-linux-5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0.zip | |
libceph: verify authorize reply on connect
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/auth_none.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions