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authorRoberto Sassu2019-08-05 18:44:27 +0200
committerJarkko Sakkinen2019-08-13 18:59:23 +0200
commit2d6c25215ab26bb009de3575faab7b685f138e92 (patch)
treec741ea6dc1f2b7040be70696eb10e3717aabdd3d /security/selinux
parentLinux 5.3-rc4 (diff)
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KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated
Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even if a TPM is not found, to avoid module dependency problems. However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is inactive or deactivated. tpm_get_random() returns an error. This patch removes the call to tpm_get_random() and instead extends the PCR specified by the user with zeros. The security of this alternative is equivalent to the previous one, as either option prevents with a PCR update unsealing and misuse of sealed data by a user space process. Even if a PCR is extended with zeros, instead of random data, it is still computationally infeasible to find a value as input for a new PCR extend operation, to obtain again the PCR value that would allow unsealing. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions