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authorLinus Torvalds2017-05-09 17:45:16 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds2017-05-09 17:45:16 +0200
commit8ee74a91ac304ad2e9e794eb96ed76f0634dec40 (patch)
tree923bffc9af9f033a87e7e1ed52e3b2226ddd27cc /security/selinux
parentMerge tag 'linux-kselftest-4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/ke... (diff)
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proc: try to remove use of FOLL_FORCE entirely
We fixed the bugs in it, but it's still an ugly interface, so let's see if anybody actually depends on it. It's entirely possible that nothing actually requires the whole "punch through read-only mappings" semantics. For example, gdb definitely uses the /proc/<pid>/mem interface, but it looks like it mainly does it for regular reads of the target (that don't need FOLL_FORCE), and looking at the gdb source code seems to fall back on the traditional ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA) interface if it needs to. If this breaks something, I do have a (more complex) version that only enables FOLL_FORCE when somebody has PTRACE_ATTACH'ed to the target, like the comment here used to say ("Maybe we should limit FOLL_FORCE to actual ptrace users?"). Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
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