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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c8
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h11
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/domain.h5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/mount.h54
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c64
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/mount.c696
9 files changed, 841 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index a16b195274de..81a34426d024 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o
+ resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index a5f9e1aa51f7..8fa6c898c44b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2159,9 +2159,14 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = {
{ }
};
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = {
+ AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount pivot_root"),
+ { }
+};
+
static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1),
- AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1),
+ AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 0),
{ }
};
@@ -2180,6 +2185,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy),
AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain),
AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file),
+ AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount),
AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns),
AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
AA_SFS_DIR("rlimit", aa_sfs_entry_rlimit),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index d0594446ae3f..ffc8c75a6785 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
*
* Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
*/
-static struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
- const char **name)
+struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
+ const char **name)
{
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 962a20a75e01..829082c35faa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#define AA_CLASS_NET 4
#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5
#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6
+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7
#define AA_CLASS_PTRACE 9
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index d9a156ae11b9..c3fe1c5ef3bc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ enum audit_type {
#define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
#define OP_INHERIT "file_inherit"
+#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot"
+#define OP_MOUNT "mount"
+#define OP_UMOUNT "umount"
+
#define OP_CREATE "create"
#define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
#define OP_BIND "bind"
@@ -132,6 +136,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
int rlim;
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
+ struct {
+ const char *src_name;
+ const char *type;
+ const char *trans;
+ const char *data;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ } mnt;
};
};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index bab5810b6e9a..db27403346c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include "label.h"
+
#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
@@ -29,6 +31,9 @@ struct aa_domain {
#define AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC 4
#define AA_CHANGE_STACK 8
+struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
+ const char **name);
+
int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25d6067fa6ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
+#define __AA_MOUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* mount perms */
+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01
+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02
+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04
+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40
+#define AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH 0x40
+
+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags);
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name);
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data);
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+ const struct path *new_path);
+
+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index af22f3dfbcce..4ad0b3a45142 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_ns.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized;
@@ -511,6 +512,65 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
+static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* Discard magic */
+ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+ flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+
+ flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+
+ label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
+ else if (flags & MS_BIND)
+ error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
+ else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+ MS_UNBINDABLE))
+ error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
+ else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+ error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
+ else
+ error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
+ flags, data);
+ }
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
+ const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = aa_get_current_label();
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
@@ -682,6 +742,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82a64b58041d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
+ audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
+ if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
+ if (flags & MS_NODEV)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
+ if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
+ if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
+ if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
+ if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
+ if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
+ if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
+ if (flags & MS_BIND)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
+ if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
+ if (flags & MS_SILENT)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
+ if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
+ if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
+ ", unbindable");
+ if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
+ ", private");
+ if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
+ ", slave");
+ if (flags & MS_SHARED)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
+ ", shared");
+ if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
+ if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
+ if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
+ if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type);
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name);
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans);
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
+ audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
+ * @data: filesystem mount flags
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
+ const char *name, const char *src_name,
+ const char *type, const char *trans,
+ unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
+ struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
+{
+ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op);
+
+ if (likely(!error)) {
+ u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+ if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+ mask = 0xffff;
+
+ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+ request &= mask;
+
+ if (likely(!request))
+ return 0;
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else {
+ /* only report permissions that were denied */
+ request = request & ~perms->allow;
+
+ if (request & perms->kill)
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+ if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+ if (!request)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name;
+ aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type;
+ aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans;
+ aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags;
+ if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
+ aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
+ * on the flags.
+ *
+ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
+static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
+ if ((1 << i) & flags)
+ state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state match finished in
+ *
+ * Returns: mount permissions
+ */
+static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+ unsigned int state)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms;
+
+ perms.kill = 0;
+ perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
+ perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
+ perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
+ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = {
+ "match succeeded",
+ "failed mntpnt match",
+ "failed srcname match",
+ "failed type match",
+ "failed flags match",
+ "failed data match"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data, bool binary, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!dfa);
+ AA_BUG(!perms);
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (devname)
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 2;
+
+ if (type)
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 3;
+
+ state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
+ if (!state)
+ return 4;
+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
+ if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH)) {
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 4;
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
+ if (!state)
+ return 5;
+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* failed at end of flags match */
+ return 4;
+}
+
+
+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ return profile->path_flags |
+ (S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devnme: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR)
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @devinfo: error str if (IS_ERR(@devname))
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer,
+ const char *devname, const char *type,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
+ const char *devinfo)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int pos, error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!mntpath);
+ AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+ error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer,
+ &mntpnt, &info, profile->disconnected);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+ if (IS_ERR(devname)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(devname);
+ devname = NULL;
+ info = devinfo;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ error = -EACCES;
+ pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms);
+ if (pos) {
+ info = mnt_info_table[pos];
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ error = 0;
+
+audit:
+ return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL,
+ flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ char *buffer, struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data,
+ bool binary)
+{
+ const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = -EACCES;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer);
+
+ if (devpath) {
+ error = aa_path_name(devpath, path_flags(profile, devpath),
+ devbuffer, &devname, &info,
+ profile->disconnected);
+ if (error)
+ devname = ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
+
+ return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags,
+ data, binary, info);
+}
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ bool binary;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+ get_buffers(buffer);
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ flags, data, binary));
+ put_buffers(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+ struct path old_path;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+
+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer);
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
+ NULL, flags, NULL, false));
+ put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer);
+ path_put(&old_path);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
+ flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+ MS_UNBINDABLE);
+
+ get_buffers(buffer);
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ flags, NULL, false));
+ put_buffers(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+ const char *orig_name)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+ struct path old_path;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer);
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
+ NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false));
+ put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer);
+ path_put(&old_path);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+ bool binary = true;
+ int error;
+ int requires_dev = 0;
+ struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ if (type) {
+ struct file_system_type *fstype;
+
+ fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+ if (!fstype)
+ return -ENODEV;
+ binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+ requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
+ put_filesystem(fstype);
+
+ if (requires_dev) {
+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ dev_path = &tmp_path;
+ }
+ }
+
+ get_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer);
+ if (dev_path) {
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer,
+ type, flags, data, binary));
+ } else {
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name,
+ type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
+ }
+ put_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer);
+ if (dev_path)
+ path_put(dev_path);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ char *buffer)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ unsigned int state;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!path);
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name,
+ &info, profile->disconnected);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ name);
+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+ return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
+ AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+}
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ int error;
+ struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root };
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!mnt);
+
+ get_buffers(buffer);
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer));
+ put_buffers(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/* helper fn for transition on pivotroot
+ *
+ * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
+ */
+static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const struct path *new_path,
+ char *new_buffer,
+ const struct path *old_path,
+ char *old_buffer)
+{
+ const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ const char *trans_name = NULL;
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!new_path);
+ AA_BUG(!old_path);
+
+ if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+ return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+
+ error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
+ old_buffer, &old_name, &info,
+ profile->disconnected);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+ error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
+ new_buffer, &new_name, &info,
+ profile->disconnected);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = -EACCES;
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ new_name);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+
+ if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow)
+ error = 0;
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name,
+ NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT,
+ &perms, info, error);
+ if (error)
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+ return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+}
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+ const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *target = NULL;
+ char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!old_path);
+ AA_BUG(!new_path);
+
+ get_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer);
+ target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
+ build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer,
+ old_path, old_buffer));
+ if (!target) {
+ info = "label build failed";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
+ error = aa_replace_current_label(target);
+ if (error) {
+ /* TODO: audit target */
+ aa_put_label(target);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* already audited error */
+ error = PTR_ERR(target);
+out:
+ put_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer);
+
+ return error;
+
+fail:
+ /* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */
+ error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+ audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */,
+ NULL /* old_name */,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
+ error));
+ goto out;
+}