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+=====================
+Intel(R) TXT Overview
+=====================
+
+Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel(R) Trusted Execution
+Technology (Intel(R) TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that
+provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.
+
+Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).
+
+Intel TXT in Brief:
+
+- Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
+- Data protection in case of improper shutdown
+- Measurement and verification of launched environment
+
+Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some
+non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems
+based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell
+Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45,
+PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets.
+
+For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
+This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual,
+which has been updated for the new released platforms.
+
+Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few
+years, some of which are:
+
+ - LinuxTAG 2008:
+ http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag.html
+
+ - TRUST2008:
+ http://www.trust-conference.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/
+ 3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf
+
+ - IDF, Shanghai:
+ http://www.prcidf.com.cn/index_en.html
+
+ - IDFs 2006, 2007
+ (I'm not sure if/where they are online)
+
+Trusted Boot Project Overview
+=============================
+
+Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre-kernel/VMM module that
+uses Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS
+kernel/VMM.
+
+It is hosted on SourceForge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot.
+The mercurial source repo is available at http://www.bughost.org/
+repos.hg/tboot.hg.
+
+Tboot currently supports launching Xen (open source VMM/hypervisor
+w/ TXT support since v3.2), and now Linux kernels.
+
+
+Value Proposition for Linux or "Why should you care?"
+=====================================================
+
+While there are many products and technologies that attempt to
+measure or protect the integrity of a running kernel, they all
+assume the kernel is "good" to begin with. The Integrity
+Measurement Architecture (IMA) and Linux Integrity Module interface
+are examples of such solutions.
+
+To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a
+static root of trust must be used. This bases trust in BIOS
+starting at system reset and requires measurement of all code
+executed between system reset through the completion of the kernel
+boot as well as data objects used by that code. In the case of a
+Linux kernel, this means all of BIOS, any option ROMs, the
+bootloader and the boot config. In practice, this is a lot of
+code/data, much of which is subject to change from boot to boot
+(e.g. changing NICs may change option ROMs). Without reference
+hashes, these measurement changes are difficult to assess or
+confirm as benign. This process also does not provide DMA
+protection, memory configuration/alias checks and locks, crash
+protection, or policy support.
+
+By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides,
+many of these issues can be mitigated. Specifically: many
+pre-launch components can be removed from the trust chain, DMA
+protection is provided to all launched components, a large number
+of platform configuration checks are performed and values locked,
+protection is provided for any data in the event of an improper
+shutdown, and there is support for policy-based execution/verification.
+This provides a more stable measurement and a higher assurance of
+system configuration and initial state than would be otherwise
+possible. Since the tboot project is open source, source code for
+almost all parts of the trust chain is available (excepting SMM and
+Intel-provided firmware).
+
+How Does it Work?
+=================
+
+- Tboot is an executable that is launched by the bootloader as
+ the "kernel" (the binary the bootloader executes).
+- It performs all of the work necessary to determine if the
+ platform supports Intel TXT and, if so, executes the GETSEC[SENTER]
+ processor instruction that initiates the dynamic root of trust.
+
+ - If tboot determines that the system does not support Intel TXT
+ or is not configured correctly (e.g. the SINIT AC Module was
+ incorrect), it will directly launch the kernel with no changes
+ to any state.
+ - Tboot will output various information about its progress to the
+ terminal, serial port, and/or an in-memory log; the output
+ locations can be configured with a command line switch.
+
+- The GETSEC[SENTER] instruction will return control to tboot and
+ tboot then verifies certain aspects of the environment (e.g. TPM NV
+ lock, e820 table does not have invalid entries, etc.).
+- It will wake the APs from the special sleep state the GETSEC[SENTER]
+ instruction had put them in and place them into a wait-for-SIPI
+ state.
+
+ - Because the processors will not respond to an INIT or SIPI when
+ in the TXT environment, it is necessary to create a small VT-x
+ guest for the APs. When they run in this guest, they will
+ simply wait for the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence, which will cause
+ VMEXITs, and then disable VT and jump to the SIPI vector. This
+ approach seemed like a better choice than having to insert
+ special code into the kernel's MP wakeup sequence.
+
+- Tboot then applies an (optional) user-defined launch policy to
+ verify the kernel and initrd.
+
+ - This policy is rooted in TPM NV and is described in the tboot
+ project. The tboot project also contains code for tools to
+ create and provision the policy.
+ - Policies are completely under user control and if not present
+ then any kernel will be launched.
+ - Policy action is flexible and can include halting on failures
+ or simply logging them and continuing.
+
+- Tboot adjusts the e820 table provided by the bootloader to reserve
+ its own location in memory as well as to reserve certain other
+ TXT-related regions.
+- As part of its launch, tboot DMA protects all of RAM (using the
+ VT-d PMRs). Thus, the kernel must be booted with 'intel_iommu=on'
+ in order to remove this blanket protection and use VT-d's
+ page-level protection.
+- Tboot will populate a shared page with some data about itself and
+ pass this to the Linux kernel as it transfers control.
+
+ - The location of the shared page is passed via the boot_params
+ struct as a physical address.
+
+- The kernel will look for the tboot shared page address and, if it
+ exists, map it.
+- As one of the checks/protections provided by TXT, it makes a copy
+ of the VT-d DMARs in a DMA-protected region of memory and verifies
+ them for correctness. The VT-d code will detect if the kernel was
+ launched with tboot and use this copy instead of the one in the
+ ACPI table.
+- At this point, tboot and TXT are out of the picture until a
+ shutdown (S<n>)
+- In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT
+ launch, TXT must first be exited. This is to prevent attacks that
+ attempt to crash the system to gain control on reboot and steal
+ data left in memory.
+
+ - The kernel will perform all of its sleep preparation and
+ populate the shared page with the ACPI data needed to put the
+ platform in the desired sleep state.
+ - Then the kernel jumps into tboot via the vector specified in the
+ shared page.
+ - Tboot will clean up the environment and disable TXT, then use the
+ kernel-provided ACPI information to actually place the platform
+ into the desired sleep state.
+ - In the case of S3, tboot will also register itself as the resume
+ vector. This is necessary because it must re-establish the
+ measured environment upon resume. Once the TXT environment
+ has been restored, it will restore the TPM PCRs and then
+ transfer control back to the kernel's S3 resume vector.
+ In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel
+ provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (RAM and RESERVED_KERN
+ in the e820 table, but not any memory that BIOS might alter over
+ the S3 transition) that tboot will calculate a MAC (message
+ authentication code) over and then seal with the TPM. On resume
+ and once the measured environment has been re-established, tboot
+ will re-calculate the MAC and verify it against the sealed value.
+ Tboot's policy determines what happens if the verification fails.
+ Note that the c/s 194 of tboot which has the new MAC code supports
+ this.
+
+That's pretty much it for TXT support.
+
+
+Configuring the System
+======================
+
+This code works with 32bit, 32bit PAE, and 64bit (x86_64) kernels.
+
+In BIOS, the user must enable: TPM, TXT, VT-x, VT-d. Not all BIOSes
+allow these to be individually enabled/disabled and the screens in
+which to find them are BIOS-specific.
+
+grub.conf needs to be modified as follows::
+
+ title Linux 2.6.29-tip w/ tboot
+ root (hd0,0)
+ kernel /tboot.gz logging=serial,vga,memory
+ module /vmlinuz-2.6.29-tip intel_iommu=on ro
+ root=LABEL=/ rhgb console=ttyS0,115200 3
+ module /initrd-2.6.29-tip.img
+ module /Q35_SINIT_17.BIN
+
+The kernel option for enabling Intel TXT support is found under the
+Security top-level menu and is called "Enable Intel(R) Trusted
+Execution Technology (TXT)". It is considered EXPERIMENTAL and
+depends on the generic x86 support (to allow maximum flexibility in
+kernel build options), since the tboot code will detect whether the
+platform actually supports Intel TXT and thus whether any of the
+kernel code is executed.
+
+The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an
+Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the
+system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is an
+(unencrypted) module signed by Intel that is used as part of the
+DRTM process to verify and configure the system. It is signed
+because it operates at a higher privilege level in the system than
+any other macrocode and its correct operation is critical to the
+establishment of the DRTM. The process for determining the correct
+SINIT ACM for a system is documented in the SINIT-guide.txt file
+that is on the tboot SourceForge site under the SINIT ACM downloads.