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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c194
1 files changed, 194 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..81b19c52832b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
+ EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
+static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
+
+/*
+ * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
+ * it does.
+ *
+ * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
+ * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes. If it
+ * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
+ * this.
+ */
+static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
+{
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned int db = 0;
+ unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
+ efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
+ return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
+ */
+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
+ unsigned long *size)
+{
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned long lsize = 4;
+ unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+ void *db;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!db)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ kfree(db);
+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *size = lsize;
+ return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist a hash.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
+ size_t len, const char *type,
+ size_t type_len)
+{
+ char *hash, *p;
+
+ hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hash)
+ return;
+ p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
+ p += type_len;
+ bin2hex(p, data, len);
+ p += len * 2;
+ *p = 0;
+
+ mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
+ kfree(hash);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
+ */
+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
+ */
+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *
+ sig_type)
+{
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+ return add_to_platform_keyring;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
+ */
+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *
+ sig_type)
+{
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
+ return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
+ return uefi_blacklist_binary;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted
+ * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
+ * keyring.
+ */
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!efi.get_variable)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
+ * an error if we can't get them.
+ */
+ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
+ db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
+ rc);
+ kfree(db);
+ }
+ }
+
+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
+ if (!mok) {
+ pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
+ mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(mok);
+ }
+
+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+ if (!dbx) {
+ pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
+ dbx, dbxsize,
+ get_handler_for_dbx);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(dbx);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);