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-rw-r--r--security/safesetid/lsm.c41
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 56e1b285a4ae..9db1c7a51d3d 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -55,21 +55,32 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
int cap,
unsigned int opts)
{
- if (cap == CAP_SETUID &&
- setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) != SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
- if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID)) {
- /*
- * Deny if we're not in a set*uid() syscall to avoid
- * giving powers gated by CAP_SETUID that are related
- * to functionality other than calling set*uid() (e.g.
- * allowing user to set up userns uid mappings).
- */
- pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
- __kuid_val(cred->uid));
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
+ /* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID. */
+ if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If CAP_SETUID is currently used for a set*uid() syscall, we want to
+ * let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in the
+ * task_fix_setuid hook.
+ */
+ if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
+ * other purposes.
+ */
+ if (setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+ * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
+ */
+ pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
+ __kuid_val(cred->uid));
+ return -1;
}
/*