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authorKarel Zak2015-05-25 15:30:52 +0200
committerKarel Zak2015-06-25 14:17:05 +0200
commit7ff1162e67164cb4ece19dd809c26272461aa254 (patch)
treed7d5625dbea3e9d19ec92e5298b106ac25474f75
parentcfdisk: fix condition logic [cppcheck] (diff)
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sulogin: improve support for locked root account
Some installations and distributions don't use a root account password for security reasons and use sudo instead. In that case, asking for the password makes no sense, and it is not even considered as valid as it's just "*" or "!". In these cases --force is required to just start a root shell and no ask for password. I don't think it's a good idea to automatically start root shell when locked account is detected. It's possible that the machine is on public place and for example Ubuntu uses root account disabled by default (and also Fedora when installed by yum/dnf without anaconda). The --force option forces admins to think about it... The distro maintainers can also use --force in their initscripts or systemd emergency.service if they believe that promiscuous setting is the right thing for the distro. Addresses: https://bugs.debian.org/326678 Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--login-utils/sulogin.88
-rw-r--r--login-utils/sulogin.c48
2 files changed, 40 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/login-utils/sulogin.8 b/login-utils/sulogin.8
index 17b07da65..9bc2effce 100644
--- a/login-utils/sulogin.8
+++ b/login-utils/sulogin.8
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ Give root password for system maintenance
.br
(or type Control\-D for normal startup):
.PP
+If the root account is locked and --force is specified, no password is required.
+.PP
.B sulogin
will be connected to the current terminal, or to the optional \fItty\fR device that
can be specified on the command line (typically
@@ -48,9 +50,11 @@ fails, then examine
.I /etc/passwd
and
.I /etc/shadow
-to get the password. If these files are damaged or nonexistent,
+to get the password. If these files are damaged or nonexistent, or when
+root account is locked by '!' or '*' at the begin of the password then
.B sulogin
-will start a root shell without asking for a password.
+will \fBstart a root shell without asking for a password\fP.
+.PP
.IP
Only use the
.B \-e
diff --git a/login-utils/sulogin.c b/login-utils/sulogin.c
index f376bfc45..be52141c1 100644
--- a/login-utils/sulogin.c
+++ b/login-utils/sulogin.c
@@ -81,6 +81,13 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t sigchild;
# define IUCLC 0
#endif
+static int locked_account_password(const char *passwd)
+{
+ if (passwd && (*passwd == '*' || *passwd == '!'))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef TIOCGLCKTRMIOS
/*
* For the case plymouth is found on this system
@@ -485,7 +492,6 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
p = line;
break;
}
-
fclose(fp);
/*
@@ -522,7 +528,8 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
warnx(_("%s: no entry for root"), _PATH_SHADOW_PASSWD);
*pwd.pw_passwd = '\0';
}
- if (!valid(pwd.pw_passwd)) {
+ /* locked accont passwords are valid too */
+ if (!locked_account_password(pwd.pw_passwd) && !valid(pwd.pw_passwd)) {
warnx(_("%s: root password garbled"), _PATH_SHADOW_PASSWD);
*pwd.pw_passwd = '\0';
}
@@ -532,7 +539,7 @@ static struct passwd *getrootpwent(int try_manually)
/*
* Ask by prompt for the password.
*/
-static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con)
+static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con, int deny)
{
struct termios tty;
@@ -549,18 +556,25 @@ static void doprompt(const char *crypted, struct console *con)
if ((con->file = fdopen(con->fd, "r+")) == (FILE*)0)
goto err;
}
+
+ if (deny)
+ fprintf(con->file, _("\nCannot open access to console, the root account is locked.\n"
+ "See sulogin(8) man page for more details.\n\n"
+ "Press Enter to continue.\n"));
+ else {
#if defined(USE_ONELINE)
- if (crypted[0])
- fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for login: "));
- else
- fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for login: "));
+ if (crypted[0] && !locked_account_password(crypted))
+ fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for login: "));
+ else
+ fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for login: "));
#else
- if (crypted[0])
- fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for maintenance\n"));
- else
- fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for maintenance"));
- fprintf(con->file, _("(or press Control-D to continue): "));
+ if (crypted[0] && !locked_account_password(crypted))
+ fprintf(con->file, _("Give root password for maintenance\n"));
+ else
+ fprintf(con->file, _("Press Enter for maintenance\n"));
+ fprintf(con->file, _("(or press Control-D to continue): "));
#endif
+ }
fflush(con->file);
err:
if (con->flags & CON_SERIAL)
@@ -980,6 +994,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
goto nofork;
}
+
mask_signal(SIGCHLD, chld_handler, &saved_sigchld);
do {
con = list_entry(ptr, struct console, entry);
@@ -996,12 +1011,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
const char *passwd = pwd->pw_passwd;
const char *answer;
int failed = 0, doshell = 0;
+ int deny = !opt_e && locked_account_password(pwd->pw_passwd);
+
+ doprompt(passwd, con, deny);
- doprompt(passwd, con);
if ((answer = getpasswd(con)) == NULL)
break;
+ if (deny)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- if (passwd[0] == '\0')
+ /* no password or locked account */
+ if (!passwd[0] || locked_account_password(passwd))
doshell++;
else {
const char *cryptbuf;